Could there be Suffering in Paradise?  
The Primal Sin, the Beatific Vision, and Suffering in Paradise

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Abstract: Paradise is often conceived as a place where suffering is not possible, so much so that the possibility of suffering in paradise has been used by various philosophers as a defeater for the possibility of paradise.\(^1\) Employing a “reverse-engineered-theodicy,” I use Eleonore Stump’s morally-sufficient-reason for why God allows suffering in this earthly world to explore one condition that must obtain for suffering to remain impossible in paradise, namely, that internal fragmentation is not possible in paradise. After developing an intellectualist explanation of the primal sin (an alleged prior instance of internal fragmentation in a paradisiacal environment), I suggest one reason to believe that the internal fragmentation of redeemed humans in paradise is not possible. However, this reason does not extend to other non-human inhabitants of paradise, and so I suggest that it remains possible that these other inhabitants might yet become internally fragmented. Given that Christ-like consensual suffering that aids a third party’s internal integration is presumably morally justifiable (How else can we justify God allowing Christ to suffer?), I conclude by suggesting that the suffering of the redeemed in paradise is in fact possible (although quite unlikely). Therefore, even in paradise, there is a place for hope that the redeemed do not suffer, and for trust in others that they do not bring such suffering into being.

1. Reverse engineering a theodicy

Consider a modified version of the evidential argument from evil:\(^2\)

1. It appears that there is no morally sufficient reason for an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good God to allow suffering in paradise.
2. Therefore, there is no morally sufficient reason for an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good God to allow the suffering in paradise.
3. There is suffering in paradise.
4. Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good God does not exist in paradise.

\(^1\) For one example see (Talbott 1990, 32).
\(^2\) See (Rowe 1979).
There are three ways a theist could respond to this argument: (i) deny premise three (the perfect-paradise response), (ii) argue that premise one does not entail premise two (the skeptical-theist response), or (iii) offer a morally sufficient reason for why God could allow suffering in paradise and so deny premise one (the morally-sufficient-reason response).

Unsurprisingly, the perfect-paradise response is most common among theists. However, if there is a successful morally-sufficient-reason response for suffering in this earthly world, I see no reason why this morally sufficient reason would not also apply in paradise, unless it can be shown either

(a) why this earth-successful morally sufficient reason is not also successful in paradise, or
(b) why this morally sufficient reason must remain inactive in paradise.\(^3\)

If (a) cannot be shown, then this morally sufficient reason for God’s allowing suffering in this earthly world is also sufficient for God to allow suffering in paradise, and so contrary to general consensus, suffering in paradise is consistent with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God. If both (a) and (b) cannot be shown, then suffering is also possible in paradise.

### 2. The best morally sufficient reason

To my mind, the most successful morally-sufficient-reason response to the problem of suffering in this earthly world can be found in Eleonore Stump’s *Wandering in Darkness* (2010). In this work, Stump suggests that suffering is always justified for the negative benefit of harm prevention, where the harm prevented significantly outweighs the suffering caused, and is justified, when coupled with some form of consent, for the positive benefit of some future suffering-outweighing good.\(^4\) Stump connects both negative and positive benefit to union with God, which she takes to be the best thing for a person. In the case of negative benefit, a person’s internal fragmentation will cause them to be permanently separated from God (the worst thing for that person); therefore, any suffering that maximizes the chance of a person’s internal integration or minimizes the chance of their further fragmentation is always justified. In the case of positive benefit, when combined with consent, a person’s suffering is justified if it leads to an increased capacity for a deeper union with God.

With respect to (a), if integrable international fragmentation did occur in paradise, or if a deeper degree of union was possible in paradise, then I see no reason why suffering for these reasons on earth is morally justifiable but not morally justifiable in paradise.

With respect to (b), if suffering for the sake of Stump’s positive and negative benefits are morally justifiable in paradise, actual suffering would only be possible if

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\(^3\) I am assuming that the morally-sufficient-reason P holds that God would be making a mistake in not allowing suffering if allowing suffering maximizes the chance of P.

\(^4\) Amputating a man’s gangrenous arm in order to save his life is an example of suffering for negative benefit, encouraging your child to run twenty miles a day so that one day they become a successful Olympic athlete might be an example of suffering for positive benefit. It is worth noting that Stump is not merely proposing a merely ‘medical’ model of suffering. Rather, Stump also believes that suffering is justified in as much as it brings a person into a second-personal experience with God.
internal fragmentation was possible, and did in fact occur, in paradise, or if a deeper degree of union with God was possible in paradise.

In what follows, I will use the case study of the primal sin to discuss the possibility of internal fragmentation in paradise.

3. Is internal fragmentation possible in paradise?

Is it possible for anyone in paradise to become internally fragmented? Well, assuming we can describe the conditions prior to the primal sin as paradisiacal, then, with the primal sin, we have an example of internal fragmentation in paradise. Before we explore two of the most philosophically developed explanations of how this could be possible, it is worth explaining in broad terms what is meant by internal fragmentation.

3.1 The intellectualist account and internal fragmentation

Internal fragmentation refers to the fragmentation of the mind. On the Thomist account, a person’s mind is composed of a will and an intellect. The will is an appetite or inclination for goodness in general; however, the will cannot apprehend what is good on its own. Apprehending something as being ‘good for x’ is the responsibility of the intellect. Every act of will is, therefore, necessarily preceded by an act of intellect, such that the will (the ‘moved mover’) is always an efficient cause and the intellect is always the final cause. Because it is also possible for the will to move the intellect (so long as there is a preceding act of intellect), Stump suggests that this Thomist account of the mind fits well with Harry Frankfurt’s account of the hierarchy of the will, such that there are first-order intellect-will moves, second-order intellect-will-intellect-will moves and (quite rarely) third-order intellect-will-intellect-will-intellect-will moves.

The intellect is capable of, and in fact does, apprehend numerous actions as being ‘good for x’ at any given time. The will, naturally, will incline itself toward anything apprehended by the intellect as being ‘good for x’. However, the will is not a digital on/off switch. As an appetite, the will is capable of inclining itself further towards those

5 Internal fragmentation is itself, perhaps, an instance of suffering, in as much as it would entail privation of permanent union with God. However, I shall suggest that whilst internal fragmentation is not possible for the redeemed in paradise, the redeemed could still suffer if internal fragmentation is possible for other angelic beings in paradise.

6 Space does not permit a discussion of the possibility of deeper union with God in paradise; however I think that the beatific vision is a great equalizer in this respect, giving everyone equally and maximally deep knowledge of God (‘knowing as we are fully known’). It is worth noting that this beatific vision appears in Revelation 22:4, after Christ’s ‘millennial reign on earth’ (whatever that means), where, presumably, the redeemed are rewarded for whatever it is they did on earth, with some people getting more reward, and some less.

7 The following ‘Thomist account’ of internal fragmentation is loosely taken from Stump (2002). This need not be the only way of understanding fragmentation, and it is quite likely the case the argument could proceed on a much less involved explanation, nevertheless I find this ‘Thomist account’ a particularly useful one given how neatly it maps on to existing attempts to explain the primal sin.

8 In this way the will can be understood as the power of intellectual appetition.

9 Stump suggests the possibility of infinite regress is avoided, as any possible fourth-order combination has in fact has exactly the same composition as a second-order combination, and any fifth-order combination will have exactly the same composition as a third-order combination (and so on). As a result, all higher-order combinations will collapse back into either second- or third-order combinations.
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desires to which it is most disposed, and to act on the desire it is most disposed toward to form an effective desire (that is, a volition). A first-order volition produces action, a second-order volition strengthens or weakens the first-order act of intellect, and a third-order volition strengthens or weakens a second-order act of intellect.

On this account, first-order desires are always apprehended by the intellect (a first-order act of intellect), but they can be involuntarily prompted by a whole series of causes external to either the intellect’s reflection on some knowledge or a second-order act of will. For instance, the intellect’s involuntary apprehension of the sensitive appetites (the passions) or the natural appetites can also prompt a first-order desire in the will. Second-order desires, however, cannot be involuntarily apprehended, for they represent an act of reason concerning first-order desires (namely, a second-order act of intellect). In this way, second-order desires represent the desires with which a person would choose to identify.

Given this account of the mind, in order for a person to be internally integrated, two conditions must obtain:

- All second-order desires must be internally integrated around the good, and
- first- and second-order volitions must agree.

With regard to the first condition, if the will is an inclination for the good in general, these second-order desires cannot be integrated around evil, but can only ever be integrated around good. Furthermore, because (so says Aquinas) goodness and being are convertible, and because God is the greatest being, and because the greatest goods for humans involve relationships, union with God is the greatest good for a person. Given the evident possibility that two good desires conflict without some unifying reason for decisively choosing between them, and given that unifying reasons are themselves capable of being more or less good than other unifying reasons, it seems a person’s mind can only ever be unchangeably integrated around a desire for their greatest good, that is, their union with God.

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10 Stump writes:

It is important to understand that an agent’s reason for an action may also be only implicit and not an explicit or conscious feature of his thought....On this view, then, it is possible that an agent’s intellect have gone through some process which contributes to a certain action on the agent’s part, without the agent’s being aware of that process as it is occurring....So to hold, as Aquinas does, that an agent wills to do some action p only if his intellect represents p as the good to be pursued does not entail that an agent does an action willingly only in case he first engages in a conscious process of reasoning about the action. Aquinas’s view requires only that some chain of reasoning (even if invalid and irrational reasoning) representing p as the good to be pursued would figure in the agent’s own explanation of his action. (Stump 1988, 400)

11 Stump describes such an unconflicted second-order desire as a ‘wholehearted’ desire, and explains to act on such would be to act with ‘strenuous freedom of the will’.

12 Frankfurt’s position is that the will is capable of integrating around evil, however Frankfurt does not employ the same intellect / will distinction Stump uses, and so on Frankfurt’s account, the will is more than just an inclination for the good. On Frankfurt’s account, the will is also responsible for apprehending the content of its desires. See Stump (2010, 138) for further discussion.

13 For instance, a person could become internally fragmented over the “desire to go to Africa to save orphans”, or “the desire to go Asia to save orphans”, given neither one is obviously better than the other. In his commentary on Buridan’s ass F.T.C. Moore (1990), suggested that so long as there is a unifying reason for action, two conflicting desires can be conflated into one desire, for example “desire to go to Africa or Asia to save orphans,” as this singular desire can satisfies the unifying desire. However, any unifying reason for action that is less good than another reason for action will always remain liable to internal fragmentation. As a result, in order to remain internally integrated, one requires a unifying reason for action that is also their greatest good.
With regard to the second condition, Stump suggests that on this Thomist account *freedom of the will* is only possible when first- and second-order volitions coincide; however, so long as your first-order intellect, first-order will and the connection between the two are not internally manipulated by a third party, you remain *morally responsible*, and therefore *prima facie* blameworthy for all your first-order volitions.\(^{14}\)

On this account, if a person has conflicting second-order desires, or acts on a first-order volition that conflicts with a second-order volition (but, importantly, not if they merely have conflicting first-order desires), then they are internally fragmented.\(^ {15}\)

### 3.2 The primal sin and internal fragmentation in paradise

With this understanding of fragmentation in mind, let us turn to the first instance of internal fragmentation, namely, the primal sin.

In looking at the primal sin, I mean to refer only to the first instance of internal fragmentation, and only then because it is an instance of fragmentation in a (supposed) paradisiacal state. Whilst I will use the traditionally accepted story of Lucifer’s fall in exploring explanations of the primal sin, whether or not the primal sin was in fact coincident with Lucifer’s fall as traditionally understood is not relevant to the strength of the proceeding argument. What is relevant is whether we can explain the primal sin in a way that satisfies a certain set of desiderata *without* suggesting that it was in some way inexplicably arbitrary; for if the primal sin was arbitrary, what is to stop the redeemed from similar arbitrary fragmentation in paradise?

The desiderata for any explanation of primal sin must (a) render God blameless for Lucifer’s internal fragmentation, and (b) put the blame for that internal fragmentation on Lucifer.\(^ {16}\) The most obvious way of satisfying these desiderata is to hold that Lucifer has what Richard Swinburne describes as ‘serious free will’,\(^ {17}\) such that he had the ability to freely will some lesser good, but that this free choice was in no way influenced by some defect created in him by God (that is, God created Lucifer morally good, intellectually flawless and supremely happy prior to the primal sin).\(^ {18}\)

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\(^{14}\) Importantly, given that first-order desires can be involuntary, you cannot be morally responsible for having conflicting first order desires. You are, however, morally responsible if one of these first-order desires becomes a first-order volition.

\(^{15}\) If a person remains internally fragmented, then their permanent union with God is impossible. Given the tremendous harm of separation from God and the benefit of union with God, if it turns out that a person’s internal fragmentation is best integrated through their suffering, then, so says Stump, suffering allowed for this end can be morally justified.

\(^{16}\) If (a) obtains but (b) does not, then internal fragmentation looks like it can only be explained by some random chance event, and is therefore arbitrary.

\(^{17}\) Swinburne writes,

...if reasons alone influence action, an agent inevitably does what he believes to be the best, so if desires alone influence action, an agent will inevitably follow his strongest desire. Free choice of action therefore arises only in two situations. One is where there is a choice between two actions which the agent regards as equal best which the agent desires to do equally; which ... is the situation of very unserious free will. The other is where there is a choice between two actions, one of which the agent desires to do more and the other of which he believes it better to do ... the more serious the free will and the stronger the contrary temptation, the better it is when the good action is done. (Swinburne 1998, 86-87)

\(^{18}\) See Pini (2011, 62) for discussion of why it is important to affirm this. Note that the claim ‘supremely happy’ is highly contentious and open for interpretation (Anselm, for instance, did not believe Lucifer was supremely happy, Aquinas thought he was only supremely happy according to a natural, but not
Such ‘serious free will’ requires that even when Lucifer was internally integrated around the good, Lucifer was capable of choosing between conflicting desires. But how could Lucifer have had conflicting desires if his mind was integrated around the good and he was morally good, intellectually flawless, and supremely happy?

Traditionally, there have been two schools of thought that attempt to explain how this internal fragmentation happened in the pre-primal sin paradisiacal state without holding God blameworthy for its happening. Both approaches suggest that Lucifer was created with an integrated second-order desire for justice (that is, the second-order desire that his first-order desires were properly ordered) and a first-order desire for benefit (that is, the desire for those things that will lead to his happiness).

The first explanatory approach to the primal sin suggests that the cause of Lucifer’s internal fragmentation occurred in Lucifer’s will (the ‘voluntarist account’, suggested by Anselm in De casu diaboli and most recently advocated by Katherin Rogers (2008, 98)). The second explanatory account suggests that the cause of Lucifer’s internal fragmentation occurred in Lucifer’s intellect (the ‘intellectualist account’, best typified by Scott MacDonald’s interpretation of Augustine’s account of primal sin (MacDonald 1998)). According to Kevin Timpe (2014), however, both responses are susceptible to the charge of arbitrariness. And again, if the primal sin was arbitrary, what might prevent the redeemed from committing a similarly arbitrary, yet internally fragmenting, sin in paradise?

On the voluntarist account, although Lucifer’s second-order desire for justice remained integrated, for some reason he was more disposed to a (perhaps involuntary) first-order desire for his own perceived benefit than a conflicting first-order desire for the greater good of union with God. But why would Lucifer’s morally good will be inclined to a sub-optimal first-order desire? Now, the will can be changed by habit, such that over time it prefers lesser goods than greater goods, but prior to the primal sin, Lucifer had presumably always opted for the greater good. So what can explain this change in the will’s disposition, beyond either a fault in the will created by God (at supernatural order, whilst Scotus believed him to be supremely happy in a natural and supernatural order). However, the assumption of Lucifer’s ‘supreme happiness’ sets the problem of primal sin in its strongest form.

That is, Lucifer must be created not just to have one desire (where the best option, by that desire, is always chosen), but to have more than one desire (where the best options for each desire might seemingly conflict).

For slightly different variants on these two, see John Pecham on the will corrupting the intellect, Giles of Rome and Peter Auriol on the indirect self-specification of the will, Godfrey of Fontaines on a variant of the intellectualist account, Duns Scotus on Lucifer’s abandonment of Eudaemonianism, Aquinas on (alleged) intellectualist determinism, and Henry of Ghent on volitional determinism. Further accounts of each can be found in Hoffmann (2007 & 2012) and Pini (2013).

Also described as ‘rectitude’, although given Stump’s previous account, this can perhaps more usefully be considered a second-order desire for union with God, which entails a desire for ‘justice’ or ‘rectitude’. As I explore these two positions, please note that this is not an attempt to do serious historical scholarship, rather, for the purposes of this paper, I am more interested in the arguments as presented.

See also Adams (1992), King (2012), Williams (2002) for further treatments of Anselm’s case.

It’s worth mentioning that on Stump’s account, one acts with freedom of the will if and only if ones first-order volition corresponds to a second-order volition. As a result, Lucifer could not (on Stump’s account) be said to have acted with freedom of the will. Nevertheless, Stump believes that one can act with the moral responsibility required to be blameworthy if one acts on a first-order volition (but only so long as the connection between first-order intellect and will, or the disposition of the will is not internally manipulated).
which point God is perhaps blameworthy for Lucifer’s actions) or a sheer, inexplicable (and seemingly random) act of will? And if it is a sheer, inexplicable act of the will, what is to prevent it happening again? Given the inexplicability of a change in the will, the inability to distinguish Lucifer’s morally good will from the likewise morally good will of those redeemed in paradise, and given that, on the Thomist account of the mind, every act of will is preceded by an act of the intellect, an intellectualist explanation for the primal sin is much more promising, or so I argue.

On the intellectualist account, at some point in time Lucifer failed to think through fully the reasons for desiring justice (a failure in the second-order intellect). By omitting to fully consider the reasons for desiring justice, some (perhaps involuntary) first-order desire for a misperceived benefit was allowed to grow stronger than it would otherwise have been allowed to grow because the second-order desire that would otherwise weaken such a desire was itself too weak to weaken it sufficiently. As a result of this ‘carelessness in practical reasoning’ (MacDonald 1998, 121), Lucifer’s (first-order) intellect presented to his (first-order) will this misperceived lesser good as being the best perceived benefit for Lucifer, and Lucifer’s will quite naturally inclined itself to this good. Just as with the voluntarist account, however, what caused Lucifer to omit sufficient consideration for justice? Was it a lapse in memory or some other created fault in himself (at which point perhaps God is perhaps blameworthy for Lucifer’s fall)? Or was it just an arbitrary act of the intellect? And again, if it was an arbitrary act of intellect, what is to prevent it happening again?

So it would seem that the charge of arbitrariness can be leveled at some point in either the voluntarist or intellectualist explanations. Having said so much, it might come as a surprise to learn that I do not intend to offer a new explanation as to the mechanics of the primal sin. Instead, I intend to look at whether there is any significant difference between the redeemed in paradise and Lucifer prior to the primal sin that might indicate whether the redeemed are susceptible to similar arbitrary fragmentation. And it is in looking for this distinguishing difference that the intellectualist account of primal sin (arbitrary as it might still appear) proves itself to be more useful than the voluntarist account.

24 Indeed, is it right to hold Lucifer blameworthy for this seemingly random change in his will?
25 For all we know, Lucifer could have involuntary passions (via an angelic sensitive appetite).
26 On Stump’s account, first-order acts of intellect can be involuntary (an involuntary apprehension of a passion, for instance), and so Lucifer cannot be blamed for having such first order-desires. He can be blamed for letting that first-order desire become a first-order volition, however.
27 It is important to note that second-order volitions only strengthen or weaken a first-order desire. A mere second-order volition is not enough to ensure a corresponding first-order volition, as any addict could tell you. What is required is a particularly strong second-order volition in order to ensure the second-order desire’s object become a first-order volition, however.
28 One tradition holds that Lucifer was given a glimpse of the incarnation, and received the revelation that he would be asked to serve creatures (i.e. humans) lowlier than himself. In failing to sufficiently consider God’s love and goodness, Lucifer chose that which seemed more fitting to him at the time; rejecting the call to what he saw as servility. Whether this first-order volition can be attributed to pride, or lust, or envy or some other such passion (or even, whether angelic beings are capable of passions) is left for others to discuss.
29 It just does seem to be the case that whatever angle one takes, there just is an element of arbitrariness in the primal sin.
30 On the voluntarist account, the cause of primal sin lay in Lucifer’s will. But if God created Lucifer perfect, Lucifer had a perfect will. Presumably the redeemed also have perfect wills in paradise, and so if
3.3 Can the redeemed become internally fragmented in paradise?

If Lucifer could become internally fragmented in paradise, is there anything stopping redeemed humans from becoming similarly fragmented? There are, I think, three possible responses to this question:

(i) There is nothing stopping redeemed humans from becoming internally fragmented in paradise.

(ii) God constrains the freedom of redeemed humans through some internal manipulation such that they cannot become internally fragmented.\(^{33}\)

(iii) There is something redeemed humans have that Lucifer never had which prevents them becoming internally fragmented but does not constrain their freedom.

The first response would indicate that internal fragmentation is possible – perhaps even likely – in an everlasting paradise. On Stump’s morally-sufficient-reason response, suffering is morally justified on the grounds that it promotes internal integration, so if it is possible for the redeemed to become fragmented in paradise, their suffering in paradise is for all we know also possible.\(^{34}\)

The second response ostensibly requires that the will of the redeemed is in some way internally constrained by God, which has the consequence of rendering their union with God in some way less serious than it could be.\(^{35}\) On the Thomist account of mind presented above, both freedom of the will (a first-order volition acting in conjunction with a second-order volition) and moral responsibility (any first-order volition) obtain if and only if there is no internal manipulation of either intellect, will, or the connection between intellect and will. God’s internal manipulation of any of these three would render freedom of the will and moral responsibility unavailable to the redeemed, at least on this account.

Given the aforementioned, the third response seems the most hopeful. But what can the redeemed have that Lucifer, traditionally conceived as the most perfect of God’s creation, did not have? Given Lucifer’s ‘perfect’ epithet, I will assume that they neither have access to any relevant power Lucifer lacked, nor do they have access to any relevant propositional knowledge that Lucifer lacked (for Lucifer’s inexplicable lack on either count could render God, arguably, blameworthy for Lucifer’s fragmentation).

In rendering God as blameless as can be, I will assume in what follows that at the point of his creation, Lucifer was morally good (having a perfect will), intellectually flawless (having perfect rationality), and supremely happy (following Aquinas, at least according to the natural order of his happiness).\(^{36}\)

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Lucifer, with a perfect will, could become internally fragmented in paradisiacal conditions, there is no distinguishing feature that could be used to explain how the redeemed could be prevented from similar arbitrary fragmentation.

\(^{33}\) Possibly by giving us unserious freewill, on the justification that we were required to exercise serious free will in order to get into paradise.

\(^{34}\) Of course, even on earth there are other ways to remedy internal fragmentation (for instance, through love), and it’s quite possible that there are even better ways to remedy fragmentation in paradise. However if my previous ‘reverse-engineered-theodicy’ move is valid, then the truth of either of those two statements does not entail that suffering is therefore impossible in paradise.

\(^{35}\) Imagine you freely married a person, and then that person hired a neurosurgeon to prevent you from ever falling out of love with them – there seems to be something amiss with this situation.

\(^{36}\) See Pini (2011, 67).
3.3.1 That which Lucifer lacked

On the intellectualist account of primal sin, the cause of Lucifer's internal fragmentation is located in his intellect. But, if Lucifer was intellectually flawless, his actions would be perfectly rational. Therefore, in the face of his *prima facie* irrational primal sin, we must admit either that he *was* not created perfectly rational (that is, he was created flawed), or that he did not have access to certain knowledge relevant to his decision making process. Any explanation that opts for the former seems unlikely to meet the desiderata we set out earlier (that Lucifer, and not God, is blameworthy for the primal sin), so let us address the latter claim, namely, that he acted rationally but lacked some relevant knowledge.

Before we do so, I want to call to mind Stump's distinction between Dominican knowledge (that is, propositional knowledge), and Franciscan knowledge (that is, knowledge by acquaintance).[^37] For example, knowledge *that* God is so-and-so counts as Dominican knowledge; knowledge *of* God, that is, as a person, counts as Franciscan knowledge. As I mentioned previously, I am willing to concede that Lucifer, prior to his decision, had all relevant Dominican knowledge;[^38] however, I think that Lucifer lacked at least some relevant Franciscan knowledge, a lack which God cannot be blamed for and which could explain why he decided as he did.

I can think of only one suitable candidate for a kind of Franciscan knowledge that Lucifer could not have had,[^39] namely, the kind of perpetual and everlasting knowledge of God, God's love and God's goodness that members of the Trinity share with each other.

I am happy to concede that Lucifer enjoyed a deep union with God – indeed, even the deepest non-Trinitarian union possible between something that is God and something that is not God. I am also happy to concede that through this union Lucifer had access to all relevant Dominican knowledge of God, as well as greater Franciscan knowledge of God than is available to unredeemed humans. However, if Lucifer was indeed supremely happy at the point of his creation, he could not have lacked anything that it was possible for him to have. Had he lacked something possible for him to have, it would have been possible for him to have been happier (by getting that which he lacked), and therefore, whilst he lacked something he could have, he could not have been supremely happy. If Lucifer was created supremely happy and did not enjoy Trinitarian union with God, I will suggest that such Trinitarian participation was at least

[^37]: See chapter three of *Wandering in Darkness* (Stump 2010) for a more detailed discussion on the distinction between what she calls Franciscan and Dominican knowledge.
[^38]: It is worth noting that all relevant Dominican knowledge might not amount to much, given divine ineffability.
[^39]: As well as this, Lucifer could not have had access to, for instance, the Franciscan knowledge of sin and forgiveness prior to his primal sin. However, as we have access to this Franciscan knowledge and it doesn't seem to ensure the correct ordering of our first- and second-order will, I am happy to leave discussion of this out.
naturally unavailable to Lucifer, and so that the ‘Trinitarian’ Franciscan knowledge of God was also unavailable to him.

Of course, one could (as indeed, Anselm did) deny that Lucifer was created supremely happy, but any such claim would leave God susceptible to blame (for instance, why was Lucifer created lacking something it was both possible for him, and good for him to have?). Aquinas goes further than Anselm, however, explaining that as Lucifer was created supremely happy with respect to natural order, he must have all the knowledge of God that, naturally speaking, he could have had. If he did not, then he would not have been created supremely happy. However, there is a supernatural knowledge of God that Lucifer could not have had access to naturally but could have been received by him with the aid of God’s miraculous intervention, and, in this supernatural order he is not supremely happy (for, presumably, he desired that knowledge as being good for him). However, God might have had a good reason for not giving Lucifer access to this knowledge (for instance, so Lucifer could exercise serious free will in choosing between whether to obey God and accept God’s aid and his timing in receipt of this knowledge, or whether to try and get it on his own timing and without God’s aid). Thus, so long as the natural knowledge God allowed Lucifer to have would have been sufficient for him to order correctly his first- and second-order will if properly attended to, God cannot be blamed for withholding this supernatural knowledge.

Interestingly, Scotus goes further than either Anselm or Aquinas in suggesting that it could be impossible, both naturally and supernaturally, for Lucifer to have received this knowledge, but that even knowing this, Lucifer could have made a morally significant, internally fragmenting wish that it were possible.

Regardless of whether Aquinas or Scotus was correct, on the account of the mind presented above, Franciscan knowledge can be apprehended by the intellect in just the same way propositional knowledge can be apprehended. On the assumption that this apprehension would have caused him to do otherwise, Lucifer’s inability to receive this Trinitarian Franciscan knowledge of God allows us to keep Lucifer as a perfectly rational blameworthy agent (he acted perfectly rationally given his lack of

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40 As I shall argue, if Lucifer lacked this knowledge, it was not because God withheld it, but because he could not receive it, in much the same way an orchid can’t experience the knowledge of sin and forgiveness, or a mouse can’t experience the beatific vision as we can.

41 Perhaps Franciscan knowledge of God’s perfect goodness and perfect love is unavailable to Lucifer because it requires a certain kind of union with God (through Christ), namely, a union analogous to marital union. On traditional Christian tradition, Lucifer was created an angelic cherub (allegedly the highest order of angelic beings). One could argue that angelic cherub’s are either not the kind of being able to enter into such a (marital) union with God, much like we can’t enter into a marital relationship with a chicken, or were never offered the opportunity to enter into such a relationship with God, perhaps because due to God’s perfect goodness, such union requires the exercise of a freely willed faith that can only be had if one has never seen God, and Lucifer has seen God. That Lucifer isn’t able to enter into such a union is no more problematic than saying a stone, or a beetle is also unable to enter into such a union with God. This is not to say that, in their own way, each created thing cannot enter into a kind of union with God, however it is to say that the kind of union they enter is not akin to a marital union (perhaps being more akin to friendship), and so there still remains a qualitative difference in the Franciscan knowledge available to Lucifer and to the redeemed.

42 Similar to MacDonald’s interpretation of Augustine, Aquinas believed that Lucifer failed to consider that he could not get access to this knowledge (through supernatural union) without God’s grace, and so tried to get it – admittedly the greatest good for him, and quite rightly desired – without God’s grace.

43 See Pini (2011, 68) for further discussion on this point.
knowledge\textsuperscript{44}, and, so long as there is good reason for Lucifer’s inability to participate in the Trinity in this way, God remains blameless for Lucifer’s fragmentation.\textsuperscript{45}

This response, however, raises more questions than it answers. I will address two of the more pressing questions raised. Firstly, how does this response help us answer the question of whether the redeemed can become fragmented in paradise? Secondly, how would this Trinitarian Franciscan knowledge have caused Lucifer to do otherwise without removing his free will?

3.3.2 How the redeemed can access that which Lucifer lacked

The only way the aforementioned response can be useful to the redeemed is if they are given access to the Trinitarian Franciscan knowledge that was unavailable to Lucifer. But if this was not possible for the most perfect of God’s creation (who has, I have already conceded, the deepest union with God available for something that is not God), how could it be possible for us, given that we are created ‘lower than the angels’? (Psa 8:5, Heb 2:7)

Well, there is at least one major Church tradition that explores how this Trinitarian Franciscan knowledge of God can be made available to the redeemed. In the writings of the Apostles and in certain Church Fathers (particularly those in the Orthodox tradition)\textsuperscript{46} we find the thought that at the beatific vision (Rev 22:4) we are called to ‘participate in the divine nature’ as St. Peter describes it (2 Pet 1:4), where we, in the words of St. Paul, we ‘know God even as we are fully known’ (1 Cor 13:12). Indeed, Jesus himself indicated that at some future time we will enter into the same relationship with God as he himself was in (John 17:20-26). Understood in the Orthodox tradition, this ‘participation’ is a participation in the divine energies of the Trinity, and at the beatific vision this participation is in some sense \textit{consummated}.\textsuperscript{47}

But for us to enter into this participation in the divine energies of the Trinity and progress beyond the relationship Lucifer had with God, we must become like God ourselves, through a process of deification (alternatively known as theosis or divinization). And indeed, this somewhat alarming thought is echoed both in the Psalms (82:6), in the words of Christ (John 10:34-35) and can be found in many of the writings of the Church fathers. For instance, St. Athanasius taught ‘God became man so that men might become gods,’\textsuperscript{48} Gregory of Nazianzus echoed this, writing, ‘Man has been ordered

\textsuperscript{44} Imagine a perfectly rational agent Mike choosing a route from town A to town B. There are two routes. One is on a paved road, and takes one mile. One is over a mountain chain, and takes three miles. Without any other knowledge, the rational actor is likely to choose the shorter paved route. However, unbeknownst to Mike, someone has planted landmines all along that route, such that it is certain if he takes that route, he will die. Although Mike’s decision was perfectly rational given his knowledge, had he extra information, he would have chosen another route.

\textsuperscript{45} See footnote 44 on reasons why Lucifer may not have been able to join the Trinity. A fuller answer to this question is beyond the scope of this paper.

\textsuperscript{46} For example, see Russell (2004) and Collins (2010) for in depth treatment of this issue.

\textsuperscript{47} I’m not aware of anyone who argues we, as finite beings, can participate in the divine essence, but the redeemed’s participation in the divine energies is sufficient to draw a distinction in the Franciscan knowledge available to Lucifer and with them.

\textsuperscript{48} See On the Incarnation of the Logos, 54
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to become God,' as did Ireneaus, 'If the Word is made man, it is that man might become
gods,' amongst many notable others.

For the purpose of this paper, I will to one side leave questions of how the
beatific vision allows us to participate in the divine energies of the Trinity, as well as
why similar participation was unavailable to Lucifer. What I will take forward is the
thought that within Christian tradition there are the resources for an (albeit
contentious) explanation for how we could come to access the Franciscan knowledge of
a perpetual, everlasting, Trinitarian union with God that Lucifer lacked.

3.3.3 A suggestion as to how the beatific vision could prevent internal
fragmentation

So, if the aforementioned is permitted, there is something in paradise we can
have that Lucifer never had, namely, 'Trinitarian' Franciscan knowledge of God
apprehensible by the intellect. However, how exactly is it that this 'Trinitarian'
Franciscan knowledge of God could prevent the redeemed from internal fragmentation
in paradise?

Let me offer one suggestion, adapted from Stump’s Thomist account of operative
grace. If the redeemed are to be prevented from internal fragmentation in paradise,
their second-order volition for justice must be sufficiently strong such that it always
correctly orders first-order desires for happiness. One way to read Stump’s account of
Aquinas indicates that operative grace is designed to strengthen (or prompt) a second-
order desire for union with God. On this account, God’s operative grace can be

49 See Orations 29.19
50 Basil the Great joins this chorus, writing 'Becoming a god is the highest goal of all', Origen believed
man’s spirit is 'deified by what he contemplates', etc. See Collins (2010) and Russell (2004) for context
and further discussion.
51 It is worth pointing out that a weaker, less controversial claim might work, too (given that drawing a
distinction between divine essence and divine energies undermines some accounts of divine simplicity).
For instance, Aquinas understands the beatific vision to affect principally the intellect, in as much as its
apprehension causes ‘the perfection of all knowledge and understanding’ (Stump 2003, 24). So long as
what is involved in this apprehension is some Franciscan knowledge that was unavailable to Lucifer, the
argument can progress.
52 I will include my own somewhat speculative explanation here, with the caveat that the argument I
propose is not weakened if this explanation turns out not to be the case, as all I require is a possible
explanation. With that caveat in mind, it could be the case that our participation in the Trinity is due to
the fact the redeemed are considered ‘the bride of Christ’. One Hebrew word for sexual union translates
as an intimate knowledge from the inside, and it seems to me as though the beatific vision is set up as the
antitype of matrimonial union. Our participation in the Trinity comes through this ‘marital-esque’ union
with Christ. By it, we become (adopted) sons of God, and it is through this deep union with Christ
(Ephesians 5:31-32 indicates we become ‘one flesh’ with Christ), that we complete the process of theosis
and participate in the Trinity. Given that this marital union is, apparently, reserved only for humans who
freely choose it, and given that there is no indication Christ offered this to any angelic being (neither was
there any compulsion for him to do so, given the intimate nature of marriage), if such intimate union with
Christ was the only way to this Trinitarian Franciscan union, it is at least plausible such union was offered
to the redeemed and not Lucifer.
53 See Stump (2003, 389-404). It is worth noting that Stump believes Aquinas to be committed to the idea
that the beatific vision ‘moves a person’s will necessarily’ (Stump 2003, 535).
54 I am here using Anselm’s word. ‘Justice’ can easily be replaced by ‘rectitude’ or ‘union with God’ and the
meaning will remain the same.
55 See Timpe (2007) for a discussion of Stump’s position. Incidentally, if operative grace is the efficient
cause of saving faith, saving faith might be best described as a conative second-order volition for union
expressed in terms of His (Franciscan or Dominican) revelation of some aspect of his love or goodness which, when apprehended by a quiescent intellect, produces a third-order desire sufficient to strengthen (or prompt) a second-order desire for union with God.\textsuperscript{56} I suggest that the ongoing apprehension of this Trinitarian Franciscan knowledge is sufficient to always produce third-order volitions sufficient to always strengthen second-order volitions (if ever these were to show even the smallest signs of weakening), such that they cannot be ignored or misinterpreted or forgotten by the first-order intellect. So long as these second-order volitions are kept sufficiently strong, the first-order will and intellect will always be correctly ordered, and a primal sin like event will not be possible for the redeemed in paradise.

This argument requires four things:
\begin{enumerate}
  \item that the redeemed are always at least quiescent to this revelation of Trinitarian Franciscan knowledge,
  \item that operative grace can be described in terms of a revelation of knowledge that once apprehended by the intellect can affect third-order desires,
  \item that this Trinitarian Franciscan knowledge is perpetually received, and
  \item that this Trinitarian Franciscan knowledge is alone sufficient for the everlasting proper ordering of first- and second-order desires.
\end{enumerate}

With regard to the first requirement, as the redeemed are justified and sanctified either during or prior to the beatific vision (and therefore that they are already internally integrated around the desire for union with God), I see no reason why the redeemed would reject this revelation from God. Indeed, it is hard to see how they would ever even be merely quiescent with respect to it, rather than outright accepting it. Given that this revelation must not be rejected, however, the redeemed do maintain some sense of autonomy over their continued integration. For if they were to reject it, then a primal sin like event would be possible for them. Given this, it is plausible to maintain (just as we can do with operative and cooperative grace) that the redeemed can act with freedom of the will, and yet it not be possible for them to become internally fragmented in paradise.\textsuperscript{57}

With regard to the second and third requirements, if this is a viable mechanism for explaining operative grace, I see no reason why it wouldn’t also be true for the revelation of Trinitarian Franciscan knowledge ongoing in the beatific vision. And indeed, if the redeemed’s participation in the divine energies of the Trinity is ongoing, there is a sense in which this Trinitarian Franciscan knowledge is being continually revealed (and in being continuously apprehended, cannot be forgotten).

With regard to the last requirement, if this Trinitarian Franciscan knowledge is alone sufficient to permanently keep the proper ordering of first- and second-order desires, (such knowledge cannot be necessary for such proper ordering, as presumably Lucifer, just like other angelic creatures who did not fall, could have maintained the

\textsuperscript{56} Stump writes regarding third-order desires, “There are also cases in which an agent’s reasoning is confused and warrants conflicting second-order desires. An agent who notices such a conflict in his second-order desires and who reflects on it may then sort out the confusion in his reasoning and form a third-order volition in consequence” (1988, 406).

\textsuperscript{57} Timpe (2007) describes this as acting with ‘quasi causation’, and argues that this is all that is required for freedom of the will to obtain.
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correct order in his will), then by adopting an intellectualist account of primal sin (i.e. that it was something in the intellect, not the will that caused the primal sin) we can have some assurance that a primal-sin-like event is not possible for the redeemed in paradise.58

3.3.4 The argument in its clearest form

Letting FK be ‘Franciscan knowledge pertaining to our Trinitarian union with God gained at the beatific vision’ and DK be ‘all Dominican knowledge pertaining to God’s love and goodness, as well as Franciscan knowledge of the deepest non-Trinitarian union possible, given divine ineffability, between a creature and God’, the argument presented looks as follows:

• P1. FK is the only knowledge sufficient to ensure the everlasting proper ordering of first- and second-order desires (because union with God is everlasting, Franciscan knowledge of God’s love and goodness is also ever present and unavoidable).
• P2. DK is sufficient for the temporary proper ordering of first- and second-order desires, however such propositional knowledge can be forgotten, or misunderstood, or misinterpreted etc.
• P3. FK sufficient for the everlasting ordering of first- and second-order desires is unavailable to Lucifer.
• P4. DK sufficient for the temporary ordering of first- and second-order desires is available to, and is in fact given to Lucifer by God.
• P5. God is in no way blameworthy for the fact FK is unavailable to Lucifer.
• C1. As FK is unavailable to Lucifer, and as Lucifer therefore does not have access to knowledge sufficient to ensure the everlasting proper ordering of first- and second-order desires, it is Lucifer's responsibility alone to recall, correctly interpret, and reflect sufficiently upon DK, which is sufficient for the temporary proper ordering of first- and second-order desires. Given this, Lucifer alone is blameworthy for incorrectly recalling, or incorrectly interpreting, or failing to sufficiently think upon DK.

It must be said that this argument relies on contentious tradition for premises P1, P3, P5, and in C1 there remains an element of arbitrariness, however if the primal sin can plausibly be explained by C1, Lucifer’s supposed omission to think sufficiently on, or incorrectly recall, or incorrectly interpret the reasons for desiring justice (i.e., DK) can be construed as meeting the desiderata we want in an a partially explicable explanation of the primal sin; namely, that God is not blameworthy for the fact FK is unavailable to Lucifer, that Lucifer is blameworthy for failing to properly consider DK, and that whether or not his omission with regard to DK is arbitrary, because the redeemed have

58 Whilst this explanation fulfils the desiderata for an explanation of primal sin, it doesn't suggest that primal sin was not arbitrary. What's important is that the redeemed in paradise are protected from a similar arbitrary fragmentation through their Trinitarian Franciscan knowledge of God available at the beatific vision.
access to FK in paradise, whatever the outcome, the answer cannot threaten their internal integration in paradise.\(^{59}\)

### 3.4 What about other inhabitants of paradise?

So far I have suggested that if Lucifer committed the primal sin whilst in a paradisiacal environment,\(^{60}\) and if that pre-primal sin environment is considered sufficiently similar to the post-beatific vision paradisiacal environment under current discussion, then internal fragmentation is possible in the post-beatific vision paradise. However, in developing an intellectualist account of primal sin that avoids both blaming God for Lucifer’s sin and obviating the problem (at least, for the redeemed) of arbitrariness by an appeal to the only-available-to-redeemed-humans Franciscan knowledge of Trinitarian union with God gained at the beatific vision, I have offered one reason why the redeemed might be able to permanently avoid a primal-sin-like event and so permanently avoid internal fragmentation in paradise.

However, this conclusion still does not entail that suffering is impossible for the redeemed in paradise. There is reason to believe that paradise is also inhabited by earthly creatures and angelic beings.\(^{61}\) For the sake of argument, I will assume that creatures cannot become internally fragmented,\(^{62}\) but evidently it is possible for angelic beings to become so (after all, several prominent Christian traditions hold that Lucifer and a third of the angels became internally fragmented after the primal sin). Now, I recognize there is a tradition that suggests the angelic beings who did not fall were rewarded with the beatific vision, however, on at least Scotus’s account of the primal sin,\(^{63}\) there is reason to believe it is both naturally and supernaturally impossible for angelic beings to access this Trinitarian Franciscan knowledge (and indeed, what little

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\(^{59}\) As an aside, one of the more interesting explanations of the story of the fall (before which Adam and Eve were presumably internally integrated, and remained so through sanctifying grace) has the serpent probe Eve’s intellectual understanding of God’s commands by misrepresenting the command God gave to Adam; ‘did God say you must not eat the fruit of any tree in the garden?’ In response to Lucifer’s obvious misrepresentation, Eve subtly misinterpreted what Adam had presumably told her about God’s command (for God only told Adam not to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil), Eve adds ‘you must not touch it’ to the command God gave Adam. As a result, when Eve touched it (which was not prohibited by God, but either misunderstood by Eve or incorrectly passed on by Adam) and did not die, she likely believed the serpents lie that eating from the tree would also not kill her, but make her ‘like God’. This misinterpretation could plausibly have been the root cause of Eve’s internal fragmentation, in as much as it caused her to think God’s command was odd (…”so eating the fruit can only be done deliberately, but what if I accidentally brushed the fruit? Would God really kill me? That seems too harsh!”…). In a similar way, some similar misinterpretation could have happened to Lucifer (albeit without anyone tempting him), and this might have been why he exploited this in his temptation of Eve. However, the explanation is still susceptible to the arbitrariness claim in as much as we now need some explanation for how a perfect intellect would misinterpret this relevant information.

\(^{60}\) By ‘environment’ I mean the relevant conditions in ‘the new heavens and earth’ and ‘whatever was there pre-primal sin’ that render both places paradisiacal. Because both conditions share many similarities, looking at possibilities in one can give indications of possibilities in the other.

\(^{61}\) See, for instance, Revelation 5:11-13 for reference to animals and angels in paradise, or Dougherty (2014) for a more modern take on the possibility of an afterlife for animals.

\(^{62}\) In as much as they are incapable of second-order desires, or some such reason. Indeed, the fact that animals do not have a soul is considered a reason why animals might not be in paradise. However, by suggesting there are creatures in paradise I do not mean to say that those creatures are resurrected, merely that God could have created ex nihilo a new set, fit for the paradisiacal environment.

\(^{63}\) See Pini (2013, 73), who argues that Lucifer and the angels were created supremely happy in the natural and supernatural order, such that there was no possibility of delayed beatification that could have encouraged a fragmentary desire.
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A glimpse of angelic life the Bible offers seems to support Scotus's position. So, if it is possible for angelic beings to become internally fragmented in paradise, and, if angelic beings do not participate in the type of beatific vision that the redeemed experience (thereby rendering unavailable to them the only Franciscan knowledge of God sufficient to protect them from a primal-sin-like event), it remains unlikely, but perfectly possible, in an everlasting paradise for angelic beings to become internally fragmented.

4. Is the internal integration of fragmented individuals possible in paradise?

On the premise that it is possible for angelic beings to become internally fragmented in an everlasting paradise, could redeemed humans ever be called upon to suffer for their integration? Well, this too certainly seems possible. After all, Christ’s sufferings can’t be justified by either the negative benefit of harm prevention (as a member of the Trinity he was already permanently united with God), neither could they be justified by the positive benefit of some deeper future union with God (again, as a member of the Trinity, his union with God was as deep as it could get). As a result, Christ’s sufferings can seemingly only be morally justified by his consenting to aid our internal integration. Given the presumed moral permissibility of this kind of justification for suffering, I see no obvious reason why we, as ‘co-heirs with Christ’, cannot be called upon to consent to suffer for internally fragmented angelic beings.

This being said, whether we could be called upon to consent to suffer for internally fragmented angelic beings depends entirely on whether internally fragmented angelic beings have the capacity to, or are given the possibility to become internally integrated once again. And without a clear understanding of angelic psychology, the answer to this question remains tantalizingly out of reach.

5. Conclusion: A reason for hope in paradise

Assuming the viability of Eleonore Stump's morally-sufficient-reason defence against the evidential problem from evil in this earthly world, I have suggested that there is no reason why the presence of integrable internal fragmentation cannot also be used as a moral justification for suffering in paradise. Using the example of the primal

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64 The one picture of angelic beings in paradise we have has them covering their faces before God, see Isaiah 6:2.

65 No matter how small the possibility, given an infinite amount of time, such a possibility can be actualised, for the same reason that if it were possible for a monkey to type out the works of Shakespeare, given an infinite amount of time, it is possible that monkey would eventually type out the works of Shakespeare.

66 Whether a paradise with internally fragmented beings in it would remain a paradise is another question.

67 In saying this I assume that in as much as Christ was unlikely to become internally fragmented when going through such suffering, we are also unlikely to become internally fragmented going through such suffering (we will have the same access to God the father, and the same Franciscan and Dominican knowledge as Christ did).

68 The biggest barriers to internal integration are the problems of guilt and shame, however. And if angelic beings are susceptible to guilt and shame, I cannot see what provision could be made to defeat them. My inability to see this provision does not, of course, mean that no provision is possible.
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sin, I have suggested that internal fragmentation is possible in paradisiacal conditions. Despite this possibility, through the development of an intellectualist account of the primal sin, I have suggested that there is at least one reason to believe that internal fragmentation is not possible for redeemed humans in paradise who have experienced the beatific vision. However, it appears plausible that the mechanism by which internal fragmentation in redeemed humans is prevented (‘Trinitarian’ Franciscan knowledge gained in our union with God at the beatific vision) is not available to some other inhabitants of paradise, namely, angelic beings. On the premise that it remains possible for these other inhabitants to become internally fragmented, and on the premise that it can be morally justifiable for us to consent to suffer to aid in their internal integration, no matter how unlikely, the possibility that the redeemed suffer in an everlasting paradise cannot be completely ruled out.

Whilst I have suggested that the redeemed needn’t worry about their own internal fragmentation in paradise, as a result of this aforementioned possibility, even in paradise there appears to be a reason for the redeemed to hope they are never called on to suffer on behalf of the integration of others, and to trust these others that they do not bring such circumstances into being.

Bibliography


69 Regardless of whether or not there was an actual primal sin like event as tradition suggests, there must have been a ‘first’ sin, and this ‘first’ sin is what I am referring to.

70 I recognise that this is a whole series of ‘if’ statements, so much so that the final possibility of us being asked to suffer for integrable angelic fragmentation is likely to be quite small, however given that paradise is everlasting, even the smallest possibility is worrisome.

71 No matter how small this possibility is, given that paradise is everlasting, there is still good reason for hope.


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