Communal Substitutionary Atonement

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Abstract: In this paper I develop and defend a new theory of the Atonement - the Communal Substitution Theory. According to the Communal Substitution Theory, by dying on the cross Jesus either takes on the punishment for, or offers satisfaction for, the sins of the human community. Individual humans have sinned, but human communities have sinned as well. Jesus dies for the communal sins. As a result, human communities are forgiven and reconciled to God, and through the event of communal forgiveness, individual human sins can be forgiven as well. Moving the focal point of atonement to communal sins has various advantages: well-known objections to satisfaction and penal theories are avoided, and many of the advantages of other theories of the atonement are organically integrated into the communal substitution theory.

1. Introduction

The Christian doctrine of the Atonement is both pivotal and puzzling. It is pivotal because the Atonement dwells at the center of Christian faith and practice. It is puzzling because, despite its pivotal nature and contrary to other central Christian doctrines such as the Incarnation, Resurrection, and the Trinity, there is very little agreement as to its nature. There are a variety of theories of the atonement (i.e. explanations of how Jesus’s ministry atones for human sin) each drawing on a various images, or metaphors used in scripture (Gunton 1988, Schmiechen 2005). However, each of these theories face significant challenges.

In this paper I develop and defend a new theory of the Atonement—the Communal Substitution Theory. According to the Communal Substitution Theory, Jesus either takes on the punishment for, or offers satisfaction for, the sins of the human community. Individual humans have sinned, but human communities have sinned as well. Jesus either offers himself as a penal substitute, or offers satisfaction, for the communal sins. As a result human communities are forgiven and reconciled to God, and through the event of communal forgiveness, individual human sins can be forgiven as well.

The Communal Substitution Theory is a version of either satisfaction or penal substitution theories (depending on how the theory is developed). Such theories have been vigorously challenged since the time of Socinus. Accordingly, after developing the theory, I shall defend it in two ways. First, I will respond to various
objections that have been thought to seriously damage these views. One such objection is the Justice Worry: how is it just for God to accept another person’s suffering in place of punishment due to us? Second, I will highlight various advantages of the theory. The theory fits well with various scriptural passages; in particular, the idea that a sacrifice is offered for communal sins has a scriptural basis. In addition, the theory organically integrates the plausible aspects of other prominent theories of the Atonement, which I take to be an explanatory virtue.

I begin by discussing the concepts of social responsibility, wrongdoing, and sinfulness (§2). Second, I present my theory, explain how it evades the Justice Worry, and highlight several advantages of the theory (§3). Finally, I defend the theory against other common objections to satisfaction and penal substitution theories (§4). I conclude (§5) that the Communal Substitution theory is a plausible explanation of the Atonement. I will not argue that it is the best explanation of the Atonement; to do so would require a detailed comparison of the theory to the best-developed versions of the other theories. I haven’t space for such a comparison. I will be content to have shown that 1) the satisfaction and penal substitution theories still have life left in them, if developed according to the Communal Substitution theory, and 2) the Communal Substitution theory is plausible and interesting enough to warrant consideration.

Before stepping onto the path of argumentation in this paper, it will be worth clarifying the notion of atonement. I understand the Christian doctrine of atonement in the following traditional sense: an account of how Jesus’s ministry, including his death, reconciles sinful humanity with God (O’Collins 2007, 10-12; Paul 1960, 18-26). God will not be reconciled with humanity unless its sin is dealt with. Dealing with sin involves at the least forgiveness of sin. I will also use the term “atonement” more generally to mean what is done (typically by the wrongdoer) to reconcile a wrongdoer with the party he or she has wronged.1 On this more general sense, one who offers atonement deals with the wrong she has done against a victim, and the act of atonement aims at reconciliation with the victim.

2. Communal responsibility, wrongdoing, and sinfulness

Individuals often bear responsibility for their actions; wrongdoers sometimes (although sadly not always) atone for their wrongdoings. For example, suppose Joe has stolen his sister’s Halloween candy. He is responsible for wronging his sister. Joe can atone for his wrongdoing, however, by, e.g., apologizing to his sister and restoring or replacing the stolen candy. By doing so he deals with his wrongdoing—he makes amends for it—in a way that aims at reconciliation with his sister. In a Christian context, Joe’s action is not only morally wrong, but sinful. An

1 See Radzik (2009) for an argument that this general notion of atonement is the best way of understanding how wrongdoers should make amends.
action is sinful in virtue of being “an offense against God,”2 and violating clear moral laws that God has explicitly endorsed clearly counts as an offense against God.3 As such, to atone for his sin, Joe must do something that reconciles himself not just to his sister, but to God. Perhaps apologizing to his sister and replacing or restoring the stolen candy is sufficient for reconciling himself both to his sister and to God.4 But according to the Christian tradition, in other cases something more ought to be done to reconcile oneself to God. One ought to repent and perhaps also (according to Roman Catholicism, e.g.) offer penance.

Groups, collectives, and communities can also have responsibilities, and be morally blameworthy for failing to fulfill their responsibilities. Many examples can be given. Governments are responsible for creating and enforcing just laws. Parents are collectively responsible for caring for their children. A company can be responsible, and blameworthy, for polluting the environment. Likewise, groups can be sinful in virtue of failing to fulfill duties towards God.

Here is another example that will later prove useful. Suppose I divide my philosophy class into groups and assign each group the task of constructing a presentation. Each group has the collective responsibility to give an adequate presentation. No individual can do this (at least for certain kinds of presentations)—certainly no individual is responsible for producing the entire presentation. Individual group members will acquire personal responsibilities that are aimed at helping the group to meet its collective responsibility. Since there are lots of different ways that the group members could assign tasks for producing the presentation, a wide range of different possible combinations of personal responsibilities are consistent with the collective responsibility to construct a presentation.5

Just as individuals act wrongly by not fulfilling their responsibilities, and are thereby morally guilty, so too groups can act wrongly and bear moral guilt by not fulfilling their responsibilities. Guilty groups can atone for their wrongdoing as well. For instance, suppose that a company is guilty for having knowingly grossly polluted the rivers in a neighboring community. The company could atone for its wrongdoing by issuing a public apology, firing or at least disciplining some relevant subset of its employees, devoting resources to cleaning up the river, and creating company policies and policing to help ensure that it will not pollute again in the future.

2 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1850.
3 This isn’t to say that something is sinful only if it violates a clear moral law that God has explicitly endorsed (see Romans 5:12-14).
4 More properly, perhaps this is sufficient for doing all that one can do to reconcile with God. It may be that there are other necessary conditions as well that, conjoined with doing all that one can do, are jointly sufficient for reconciliation. Christians, for example, often add that Jesus’s atonement is necessary.
5 Some argue that collective responsibilities either do not exist or are reducible to sets of individual responsibilities. I believe there are good reasons to reject this view, although I cannot explore them in any detail here (Isaacs 2011). See Smiley (2010) and the essays in May and Hoffman (1991) for a nice overview of the debate on this issue, and others, concerning collective responsibility.
Perhaps to fully atone the company would also have to undergo some sort of punishment by, say, paying a fine or submitting to a special external regulation.

At this point, we immediately face a difficult question: how does a collective responsibility \( X \), and guilt for not fulfilling \( X \), relate to individual responsibility and guilt? There has been considerable debate about how to answer this question,\(^6\) and I do not intend to present here my own general account. Rather, I will simply note a few constraints on any good answer. First, in many, maybe all, cases in which a group failed to fulfill \( X \) at least some individuals in the group bear guilt for individual actions that causally influenced the fact that the group failed to fulfill \( X \). Second, individuals in the group may bear different levels of guilt for not fulfilling \( X \) depending on how crucial their own actions or omissions were to \( X \) not being fulfilled. Third, the level of guilt one group member has depends upon the knowledge he or she has of what other group members were doing.

Now, suppose group \( G \) has violated responsibility \( X \), and suppose that there is a subset of individuals in \( G \), \( S \), such that each individual in \( S \) is individually responsible, and at fault, in some way for at least some action that he has performed in virtue of his action’s relationship to the failure of the group to fulfill \( X \). We can say that each member of \( S \) bears individual responsibility for \( G \)'s collective wrongdoing. An action in virtue of which a person bears such responsibility we will call an individually embodied collective wrong (IECW). I will stay neutral about what principles determine which members of \( G \) are also members of \( S \).

I now want to make several observations about atonement for collective wrongdoing that, as we shall see in §3, are salient to the Communal Theory of Atonement. First, the group \( G \) can atone for its wrongs without each individual in \( S \) making individual atonement for his or her IECWs. For instance, in the above example of a company that atones for having knowingly grossly polluted the rivers in a neighboring community, it is not necessary that each individual in the company atone for his or her IECWs. The company can atone in the suggested way even if there are some members of \( S \) that are not punished and who do not apologize for what they have done. Some subset of \( S \) can perform whatever is needed to atone for \( G \)'s wrongdoing.

Second, once \( G \) has atoned for its wrongdoing by, say, accepting some punishment or offering something by way of satisfaction, the members of \( G \) who have committed IECWs may permissibly atone, and be forgiven, for their IECWs while offering less than what the group offered. Suppose that the company we have been considering has atoned for polluting the environment by paying a fine, instituting new procedures, and accepting extra regulation. Joe, a company employee, is unaffected by these means of atonement even though he looked the other way while his coworkers polluted. He should have said something—and he had the authority to affect things—and so he has committed an IECW. Given that the company has already atoned for polluting, it seems perfectly morally permissible for

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\(^6\) See Isaacs (2011) for a recent full-length treatment of this issue and Isaacs and Vernon (2011) for a collection of essays offering a diverse range of views on this issue.
Joe to atone for his IECW merely by admitting he acted wrongly, showing remorse for his actions, and committing to do his part to help prevent the company from polluting in the future. This seems like a fine way of atoning even though Joe did not contribute to the company’s atoning acts; he offered less than what the group offered by way of atonement. We may permissibly forgive him as well. It is acceptable for Joe to offer less because the goal of atonement is reconciliation. The company has already reconciled with the community, thus making it easier for Joe—a member of the group—to reconcile with the community. As long as he identifies with his company’s offering of atonement and repents of his contributions to its wrongdoing, he can be reconciled to the community along with his company. The company’s atoning acts fuel its drive towards reconciliation with the community; Joe needs merely to step aboard through confession and repentance.

Third, $G$ can offer atonement either by $G$ (in some sense) as a whole offering atonement, or by some subset of $G$ offering atonement for the group on behalf of the group. Examples of the former are when a company pays a fine from its profits (no individual pays the fine, although of course somebody has to authorize the transfer of funds), or when a company faces some additional external regulation (for example, that it must reduce pollution by 10%). Examples of the latter are when a company CEO offers an apology on behalf of the company and when higher brass are fired or forced to resign. A group may atone in both the former and latter sort of way in some cases. In the former sort of atonement, there is a sense in which every member of $G$ is punished/offers satisfaction; every member is affected in some way by the punishment. This sense is not present in the latter sort of atonement.

The latter sort of atonement will play an important role in the Communal Substitutionary Theory, and so merits further elaboration. In this sort of atonement, some set of individuals, $A$, offers atonement on behalf of $G$. Who can be a member of $A$? It seems that any member of $A$ must somehow be appropriately causally connected to $G$’s failure to fulfill its responsibility $X$. Typically, then, members of $A$ must also be members of $G$ for typically a group culpably fails to fulfill its responsibility in virtue of the actions of the members of the group. There may be cases in which someone outside of $G$ bears responsibility for $X$ by, say, encouraging members of $G$ to violate $X$. Such a person may justly be a member of $A$. But, even in cases like this at least some member of $G$ must also be in $A$ because the group itself has to confess guilt and do something to acknowledge and atone for the harm it has culpably done.

I deliberately leave the “appropriately” part of being “appropriately causally connected to $G$’s failure to fulfill its responsibility $X$” vague. Since philosophers haven’t come up with a viable definition of knowledge, I feel pretty confident there will be no viable definition of what counts as “appropriate” in this formulation.

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7 To be sure, in some cases we in the community would like individual perpetrators to be punished in some way as well for their IECWs. So, I am not arguing that it would always be morally acceptable for a perpetrator, like Joe, to atone merely by way of confession and repentance. I am arguing for the weaker position that atonement for IECWs in this sort of way can be morally acceptable.
Nevertheless, the qualification is important and substantive because it at least sets vague boundaries for who can be a member of \( A \). For instance, those who had nothing to do with the failure of \( G \) to fulfill \( X \) and those whose actions had little causal influence at all surely shouldn’t be members of \( A \). It would be wrong, for instance, for the polluting company to atone by firing a few janitors and reducing the salaries of some accountants who may have heard rumors of the polluting, but did nothing to stop it. These individuals have little to no significant causal connection to the failure of \( G \) to fulfill \( X \). In short, “appropriately” should be understood to rule out scapegoating.

Although typically members of \( A \) will themselves have performed IECWs, it is not necessary that members of \( A \) have performed IECWs. For instance, it seems acceptable for the president of the company to reduce his own salary or pay most of the fine by way of partial atonement even if the president did not himself perform an IECW. Suppose some underlings carried out the pollution plan and did their best to hide it from the president, who was thus non-culpably ignorant that the company was violating its duties. The president may thus “accept responsibility” even though he isn’t himself morally responsible for contributing to the company’s violation. He can do this because he is crucially causally responsible, even if not morally responsible, for the violation: he hired the people whose actions led to the company violating \( X \), and he is in charge of overseeing that the company fulfills its basic duties. If he had been more diligent in checking for potential violations, he could have easily prevented the violation. Of course, a president in such circumstances is under no obligation to himself pay restitution or suffer punishment, but it would be morally acceptable if he voluntarily did so as part of the company’s atoning for its wrongdoing.

Fourth, the best sort of atonement will also somehow aim to improve the group so that wrongdoing of the relevant sort are less likely to happen in the future. The polluting company, for instance, would better atone for its wrongdoing by paying some fines, developing a new pollution oversight committee, and offering rewards to those who report potential polluting activity than by simply paying heavier fines with no attempt to change how it operates.

### 3. The Communal Substitution Theory of the Atonement

The essence of the theory is fairly straightforward. God has given the human community certain duties (e.g., following the moral law and following the two greatest commandments—loving God and loving your neighbor as yourself). These are duties not just for individual humans to follow, but for communities to follow; a community can respect these duties better or worse depending upon how they

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\( ^8 \) Coaches say this all the time when their team underperforms. They sometimes say this even when they have done all that can reasonably be expected of them to prepare their team, and yet their players bungle some key plays.
manifest love for God and how they, communally, treat the members of their communities and the members of other communities. However, the human community has failed in its communal duties to God. Individuals in the community are guilty, and the community as a whole is guilty of sin. Jesus, as the incarnate son of God, is a member of the human community and, through his life, death, and resurrection atones for the sins of the human community.\(^9\)

The nature of the atonement offered can be interpreted in either a penal substitutionary or satisfaction way. On the former interpretation,\(^10\) Jesus pays the punishment for the sins of the human community through his suffering and death on the cross. On the latter interpretation, Jesus’s life and death are offered to God as a satisfaction for the moral debt we owe him because of our sinfulness; Jesus gives to God on our behalf what our community couldn’t give him, namely, a life of perfect obedience and holiness, devoted to the two greatest commandments even to the point of persecution and death. Inspired by Swinburne’s (1989) version of the satisfaction theory, we might say that the human community offers Jesus’s life and death as reparation and penance for its sins.

That Jesus offers atonement for communal sins enables the theory to avoid a classic problem for penal and satisfaction theories—the Justice Worry. Anselm, the great innovator of the satisfaction theory, has his interlocutor, Boso, raise the worry near the beginning of *Why God Became Man*: “what justice is it for the man who was of all the most just to be put to death for a sinner? What man would not be judged worthy of condemnation, if he were to condemn someone innocent and release the guilty party?”\(^11\) However, as noted above in §2, it is entirely morally permissible for

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\(^9\) There are historical precursors to this view. First, very many theologians talk of Jesus atoning for the sins of man or mankind. This is ambiguous between atoning for the sins of each individual human and atoning for the collective sins of mankind. The popular theories cash out the talk in the former way. Second, Bethune-Baker describes Iranaeus’s view in a way that is very close to my idea here. He writes, “[Iraneaus] points to Christ as the great representative of the human race, in whom are summed up all its ripe experiences as they are contained in germ in Adam. What Christ achieves the whole race achieves. Just as mankind in Adam lost its birthright, so in Christ mankind recovers its original condition. The effect of Adam’s acts extended to the whole company of his descendants, and the effect of Christ’s acts is equally co-extensive with the race. In each case, it is really the whole race that acts in it representative” (quoted in Grensted 1920, 58). There are differences between my theory and Iraneaus’s, but he has a clear emphasis on Christ being a representative for the race, not just for a bunch of sinful individuals. Third, the moral government theory, also known as penal non-substitution (Crisp 2008), associated with Grotius and certain theologians inspired by Jonathan Edwards (Crisp 2012), bears some resemblance to the communal substitutionary theory. On the penal non-substitution view, Christ is a “penal example” (Crisp 2012, 86) whose suffering is of sufficient value to match the penal debt humans owe to God. God shows how seriously he treats sin by accepting Christ’s suffering instead of enforcing punishment on humans. God thus enforces rectoral justice (i.e. governing the cosmos in accordance with moral law) without enforcing retributive justice towards individual sinners. Fourth, some of Lucas’s (1994) comments come close to a communal substitution theory.

\(^10\) See Grensted (1920) for the history of and descriptions of penal substitution theories. Schreiner (2006) is a recent defense of a penal substitution view.

\(^11\) Anselm (1998, 275). Anselm goes on to present the worry as part of a dilemma: “If God could not save sinners except by condemning a just man, where is his omnipotence? If, on the other hand, he
a member of a community to suffer punishment or offer satisfaction on behalf of the community; this is precisely what Jesus does, according to the Communal Substitution Theory.\textsuperscript{12}

A pair of examples will help cement the idea that it is morally permissible for a member of a community to suffer punishment or offer satisfaction on behalf of the community. First, consider an example of individual wrongdoing: a basketball player intentionally punches another player during a game. The league rightly fines the offending player. It seems wrong for someone other than the offending player (e.g. a teammate, his fans, his mother) to pay this fine. Fines for violent offenses ought to be paid by the offender himself.\textsuperscript{13} Next, consider a case involving the same kind of wrongdoing, instead at the collective level: a basketball team gets into a fight with another team during a game. The commissioner decides to punish the offending team—not simply each individual fighting player—with a fine. Now, there are lots of morally acceptable ways for the team to pay the fine. The players could each contribute some money. One player (even if he didn’t himself throw any punches) could decide to foot it for the team. The coach could decide to foot it for the team (again, even if he didn’t throw any punches). Of course, some ways of paying the fine would be wrong. For instance, it would be wrong for the fans to voluntarily pay the fine because the team ought to pay it. It would be wrong for team management to pay the fine by reducing the salaries of the janitors and stadium workers. Although the janitors and stadium workers are in some sense part of the team (they’re at least part of the team organization, and we can suppose that it was the organization that was fined), doing this would treat them as scapegoats. Here’s the key point: there are morally acceptable ways for members of the team—even members who didn’t throw any punches or taunt any of the opposition—to pay the team’s fine. Matters are quite different in the first case; there it does not seem morally acceptable for other members of the team to pay the fine for the offending individual player. Individual wrongdoing should be atoned for by the guilty individual; collective wrongdoing should be atoned for by the guilty collective, but there can be morally acceptable ways for members of the collective to atone on behalf of the group.

So, there isn’t any moral problem in principle with Jesus atoning by way of punishment or satisfaction for the collective sins of the human community, even if

\textsuperscript{12} If what I have argued is correct, there is also no conceptual incoherence in the notion of accepting punishment for communal sins. Mark Murphy (2009) objects that penal substitution theories are incoherent because if A suffers for B’s wrongdoing, A is not punished because punishment necessarily expresses condemnation and A’s suffering does not express condemnation for what B did. This objection does not apply to the Communal Substitution Theory; a group can be condemned for its wrongs by some subset of the group paying a punishment for the sins of the group.

\textsuperscript{13} Of course, there are fines that we think it perfectly acceptable for others to pay on our behalf, such as traffic fines. It is fines like these that lead David Lewis (2000) to argue that we are of two minds about penal substitution.
there is a moral problem—granting the Justice Worry—in principle with Jesus atoning by way of punishment or satisfaction for an individual’s sins. Now, one might grant that there is no moral problem in principle, yet still question whether in point of fact Jesus’s life and death constitute a morally acceptable atonement for the sins of the human community. How can he be an appropriate representative given that he isn’t sinful?

Although Jesus is innocent of sin, he is nevertheless appropriately causally connected to the human community’s sinfulness. He is analogous to the innocent president mentioned in my third point in §2 who accepts punishment due to his company. Jesus, as the second person of the Trinity, created humans and set laws for the community. Not only is he causally responsible for the existence of the community, but through the various activities he has done throughout salvation history (e.g. guiding Abraham, freeing the Jews from Egypt, sending prophets, judging sinfulness) he is also causally responsible for the maintenance of the community. Furthermore, as a human, Jesus fulfills the requirement (defended in §2) that at least one member of the guilty community do something to atone for their sin.

One might worry that, although Jesus is an appropriate representative for the human community, it would be wrong for him to accept hard treatment (i.e. suffering and death) either as a punishment or part of satisfaction for the sins of the community. Hard treatment might seem wrong because Jesus is completely innocent of sin; treating him in such a way might seem to make him into a scapegoat. However, I don’t think these worries are well-founded. Consider two examples. First, it seems acceptable for a coach to resign as satisfaction for his team’s failure, even if he is not culpable for its failure. One might question the prudence of such a move, but there doesn’t seem to be anything morally wrong about it. Note that resignation can have serious harmful consequences on the coach’s future. Second, suppose a team doesn’t play well or practice well, and to atone the leader says he will run everybody’s laps. This involves considerable physical and psychological suffering. This seems morally acceptable. So, it does seem morally acceptable for innocent members of a community to suffer in order to atone for communal wrongs. It is true that death is a harder form of treatment than the cases of suffering I have presented, but it doesn’t follow that accepting death to atone for one’s community is never acceptable. Perhaps it would normally be unacceptable—and we might thus not allow it in merely human interactions—but, there isn’t a clear reason for thinking that it is never morally acceptable. Indeed, the difference in sorts and levels of suffering in the two examples above suggests that if the circumstances are right, it may be morally acceptable for an innocent representative of a community to endure severe suffering, including death, by way of atonement. I suggest that several of the considerations in favor of the Communal Substitution Theory discussed below provide reason for thinking that the
circumstances are appropriate in the case of Jesus atoning for human communal sins.\textsuperscript{14}

Let us now grant that Jesus atones for the collective sins of the human community; how are individual human sins resolved? According to the Communal Substitution Theory, each individual human’s sin can be forgiven through the atonement offered by Jesus. Every human sin contributes to the community’s failing to fulfill its communal duties to God. This is because, at a general level, individual and communal human duties are identical—their duties are to follow the two greatest commandments. Insofar as an individual human violates the two greatest commandments, the community of which he is a member also violates the two greatest commandments. When an individual violates the greatest commandments, she sins and bears individual guilt. However, since she is a part of the human community that also has a duty to follow the greatest commandments, she contributes to the community failing to fulfill its duties.\textsuperscript{15} So, every human sin is an individually-embodied collective wrong (IECW). I argued above that IECWs can be forgiven, provided that the group has offered atonement, and that the individual herself has acknowledged her own wrong and recommitted herself to doing what is right (in other words, she has repented). Such a person can accept the atonement offered by the group as her own, and as a result be forgiven.

The Communal Substitution Theory thus provides an account of how individual and communal human sin are atoned for and forgiven, avoids the Justice Worry, and illustrates how both penal substitution and satisfaction theories can be

\textsuperscript{14} See, in particular, my explanation of why the incarnation is necessary for salvation, why death might be part of the punishment or satisfaction, and how the Communal Substitution Theory incorporates advantages of other theories of the atonement.

\textsuperscript{15} Notice that for communities like clubs or companies, instances of individual wrongdoing do not always constitute or result in communal wrongdoing. Suppose that Jim abuses his wife. It does not follow that the company is guilty of spousal-abuse, or even of allowing people to abuse their spouses. Companies don’t have a duty, as companies, to not abuse spouses. The company would not bear collective guilt, and so the group would not need to atone for spousal-abuse. Jim alone would bear guilt and need to offer atonement. There are cases where a group has a duty to $X$, individuals in the group have a duty to $X$, and yet an individual failure to $X$ does not amount to an IECW. Suppose John works for a chemical plant that has a duty not to pollute. John also has an individual duty not to pollute (let’s imagine). Suppose John violates his individual duty by using excessive fertilizer on his lawn. His actions do not amount to an IECW and do not result in his company failing in its collective duty to not pollute. Why? Because John does not act as a company employee when he excessively fertilizes his lawn. In contrast, imagine a case where John uses excessive fertilizer because the company wants to test out a new fertilizer. In this case, John’s act of fertilizing is an action taken as a company employee, and so not only is John guilty of violating an individual duty, but also the company has failed its collective duty, and John’s action is an IECW.

Now, consider the human community’s responsibility to $X$ and an individual human’s responsibility to $X$. When an individual violates $X$, that individual acts as a member of the human community. So, not only is the individual guilty of violating her individual duty to $X$, but because she so acts as a member of the human community, the human community also violates its communal duty to $X$, and so the individual violation is an IECW. We always act as members of the human community, whereas we only sometimes act as members of our family, or as employees, or as members of clubs.
developed to avoid one of their strongest challenges. However, the theory might be little more than a logically and morally coherent curiosity if it didn't cohere with other Christian theological doctrines. I believe, however, that the theory fits very well with a variety of Christian theological claims, that it has some basis in scripture, and that it naturally incorporates the advantages of other prominent views of the atonement. I shall now proceed to justify these claims.

The Communal Substitution Theory can easily explain two very widespread Christian claims about salvation:

A. Faith is necessary for salvation

B. The incarnation is necessary for salvation

For an individual to be saved, it is necessary that the individual’s sins be forgiven. According to the theory, an individual human would not be forgiven of their IECWs unless they admit their sins, commit to changing their ways (i.e. repent), and accept the atonement offered on behalf of the human community by Jesus. Accepting Jesus’s atonement constitutes some degree of faith in Jesus. Full faith, or ideal faith, surely involves much more than simply believing that Jesus died as an atonement for one’s sins. But accepting Jesus’s atonement surely suffices for having some level of faith in Jesus.

The incarnation is necessary for salvation because no human or group of humans at any given time can appropriately represent the human community by way of offering atonement. No individual or group is entirely causally or morally responsible for humanity’s failing to fulfill its collective duties (except for Adam; more on this shortly). Each individual and group bears some responsibility for humanity’s failing to fulfill its collective duties simply in virtue of the fact that they have themselves failed to fulfill those duties in their individual lives, or in their group interactions. However, humanity failed its duties well before any individuals or groups at a given time existed (again, except for Adam), and many human individuals and groups have failed to fulfill their duties independently of the wrongdoing of other individuals and groups (e.g. my sinfulness is independent of the sinfulness of some individual living in Romania). So, no given set of individuals is

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16 Alister McGrath (1997) notes that this is a widespread conviction throughout the history of Christian thought. For many Christian groups, this is a basic doctrine. See, e.g. *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 161; *Westminster Confession*, ch. 14. Oden (2002) contains a collection of relevant quotations from Patristic and Reformation sources.

17 Gerald O’Collins writes, “The fathers of the Church shared two basic convictions. First, the situation of fallen humanity was so desperate that any effective saviour of humanity must be divine; only the personal presence of the Son of God among us could have brought salvation” (2007, 81). I shall later draw attention to the second conviction and indicate how it also follows from the Communal Substitution Theory.

This is a particularly important point to address given that Bayne and Restall (2009) argue that many popular theories of the atonement fail to adequately “draw a meaningful connection between the atonement and the incarnation” (2009, 155).
entirely, or even largely, causally or morally responsible for the sinfulness of the human community, and would not function as an appropriate representative if they were to provide atonement. In addition, as noted in point four of the previous section, the best sort of atonement will also provide some means to improve the group to prevent future violations of communal duties. Any set of non-divine human beings has extremely limited ability to do this. So, no human or set of humans appropriately represents the human community; the creator of the human community would be an appropriate representative if he were to become a member of the human community. Thus, the incarnation.

One might reply as follows: suppose everybody offered something by way of atonement, analogous to how a company could atone by having every member of the company suffer a pay cut. Would this not be sufficient for communal atonement (and individual atonement for those who appropriately accept the atonement offered by the group, and who express remorse and commit to changing their ways)? This question is an instance of a more general question that has dogged theories of the atonement: was Jesus's incarnation and death strictly necessary for atonement, or could God have simply forgiven us when we repent (or accepted some token punishment from every sinful person, together with repentance)?

I follow Aquinas and, more recently, Swinburne in asserting that God could have forgiven us without requiring punishment or satisfaction. However, it is far better for humans and for our future relationship with God that we accept punishment or offer satisfaction. Defending this claim fully would require another paper of its own, so I will only outline a brief defense, drawing on and referring to the work of others for further support. First, forgiving the mass of human sin while requiring no punishment or satisfaction does not seem consistent with taking sin seriously. To do so would seem to make a statement that human sin wasn’t seriously bad or wrong. But, of course the sheer amount of human wrongdoing is overwhelming, with some of it being quite terrible. Far better to arrange for a means of reconciliation that does not involve God making (even implicitly) such a plainly false statement.18 Second, surely God would want us to be aware of the enormity of human sin as part of repentance; he would want us to treat sin seriously and we couldn’t treat it seriously without being aware of its enormity. One excellent way for humans to truly appreciate the enormity of their sin is to pay a cost for it—either by way of punishment or satisfaction. Third, humans who are ideally repentant would want to offer the best satisfaction they could, or perhaps even would want to suffer an appropriate punishment.19 Fourth, God’s ultimate goal for humans is not just to forgive our sins, but to restore us to his image (as Athanasius 1996 would put it), and to bring it about that individual humans and the human community function as they should. Simply forgiving us, even if we are genuinely repentant, won’t accomplish this goal. Indeed, because it would make a statement that sin isn’t seriously wrong, such a policy of forgiveness might be counterproductive. Humans

18 A similar point is made by Purtill (1990, 41-3).
19 See Stump (1988, 70f) for discussion of this point.
wouldn’t see sin as bad as it actually is, and would be less motivated to actually change their ways. But, it isn’t just that Jesus’s atoning acts show us how seriously God takes sin. As J.R. Lucas argues, identifying with Jesus’s suffering and death can have a transformative effect on us. He writes,

if I identify with Jesus, I can be at one with God, and live a new life in Christ. But also, if I identify with Jesus, I shall begin to feel for Him and with Him in His suffering. ... I am unsaying the values of the old man ... I am able to do this, by identifying with Christ, and in so doing, make manifest my repudiation of the worldly values that led to His crucifixion, and the human self-centeredness that left God no other way to get through to us than living among us, and suffering the worst that can befall a man (Lucas 1994, 274).

So, if God wants to restore humans, not just forgive them, requiring punishment or satisfaction might well be more productive than a cost-less forgiveness. Why should Jesus’s death be part of the punishment or satisfaction? If we assume Jesus dies as punishment for the sins of the human community, such a death seems like an appropriate punishment for the sins of the human community. After all, the human community has done a whole host of truly wicked things, and death is surely the most extreme punishment one could undergo. Furthermore, according to the gospels, Jesus died as a rebel, hanging on the cross between two revolutionaries. This is quite symbolically apt when viewed through this penal interpretation of the Communal Substitution Theory, since Jesus dies in the place of the human community, who truly are rebels against God’s law.

If, instead, we assume that Jesus offers a satisfaction for the sins of the human community, then his death can be understood as the final result of a life completely devoted to following God’s will in a world where sin is rampant. This is the kind of devotion we owe to God in virtue of our collective duties toward God. So, Jesus offers, on behalf of the human community, something that we owed to God all along through our collective duties. This is an appropriate satisfaction, much as a child may try to atone for not doing her duty of washing the dishes by, in the future, washing the dishes and doing some extra cleaning.

Wouldn’t torture be worse? Perhaps, but note two points. First, Jesus’s death as depicted involved suffering that could well amount to torture. Second, and more importantly, we needn’t assume that God would accept only the worst punishment. Rather, it seems sufficient to accept a punishment that takes sin seriously. This sort of punishment seems to do that, and it does so in a way that sinful individual members of the human community can identify with.

One might wonder whether Jesus’s death is well-enough explained on this kind of view. Porter (2004) expresses exactly this worry for Swinburne’s theory, which makes a move similar to the one just described. Perhaps Porter is right that a penal theory better accounts for the death of Jesus; if so, then one can understand the Communal Substitution Theory along penal lines. But, perhaps the satisfaction explanation can be developed to mollify Porter’s worry; if so, then the Communal Substitution Theory can be understood along satisfaction lines. I stay neutral about which is the best way to develop the theory.
The Communal Substitution Theory nicely explains why Paul compares Adam to Jesus. Adam brought sin into the world, Jesus brought grace (Rom. 5:12-19). Not only is it appropriate to compare these two because of their unique causal influence on sin in the world, but also because they are both representatives of the human community. One representative—the father of the human race—brought sin into humans, and another representative—the creator of the human race incarnate—acts to remove sin from the community.

Various passages in scripture lend support to the Communal Substitution Theory. Many scholars have pointed to various passages in support of either a penal or satisfaction theory (Hill and James 2004; Morris 1983; Schreiner 2006). Lacking the space and expertise, I will not discuss these passages here. I simply note that insofar as these passages support a penal or satisfaction theory, they also support the Communal Substitution Theory.

I do, however, want to draw attention to some of the ways in which scriptural passages support the ideas of communal responsibility and communal atonement that lie at the heart of the Communal Substitution Theory. N.T. Wright has argued extensively that the Old Testament is a story of God’s attempts to redeem humanity from the power of sin, and that he uses the nation Israel as his instrument for doing so. However, Israel has herself fallen under the power of sin and needs redemption. Wright emphasizes how it is a story of God’s relationship with a nation—a group of people—not just a bundle of individuals. In this story, the main concern is with the nation’s guilt and forgiveness. Wright states, “This needs to be emphasized in the strongest possible terms: the most natural meaning of the phrase ‘the forgiveness of sins’ to a first-century Jew is not in the first instance the remission of individual sins, but the putting away of the whole nation’s sins” (1992, 273). Individual sin and the forgiveness of individuals is important too, but Wright thinks that these are to be understood within the context of the nation’s relationship to God.

This emphasis on the forgiveness of national sins shows up in one of Israel’s annual events—the Day of Atonement, described in Leviticus 16. On this day, a bull and goat are sacrificed to purify the Most Holy Place and the Tent of Meeting—which had been defiled by the sins of Israel—and another goat is released into the desert to carry away Israel’s sins. This event is specially designed to atone for the sins of Israel—the community. For Leviticus states, “he [i.e. Aaron] will make atonement for the Most Holy Place because of the uncleanness and rebellion of the Israelites” (16:16) and the atonement has been offered for “himself [i.e. Aaron], his household and the whole community of Israel” (16:17). In addition, the Israelites had other sacrificial ceremonies for addressing individual sins; if individual sins were the only sins that needed to be resolved, then there would be no need for a special sacrifice for the community.

So, the Old Testament shows a distinct concern for the sins of the community of Israel. This is significant for the doctrine of the atonement because Jesus’s death

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22 See footnote 9 for a quotation that describes some of the parallels made between Jesus and Adam.
23 See also 1 Cor. 15, where the comparison is that though Adam brought death, Christ brings life.
is described in the New Testament as a sacrifice, and imagery from the Day of the Atonement is used to elucidate what Jesus's sacrifice means. Wright also argues that a variety of aspects of Jesus's teaching and actions show that he was fundamentally concerned with resolving the sins of Israel. The Communal Theory of the Atonement explains very well the scriptural concern with communal sins, and the comparison of Jesus's atoning death with the Day of Atonement. Indeed, this is evidence for the Communal Theory over against other penal and satisfaction theories, which are silent on communal sins.

The final advantage of the Communal Theory that I wish to discuss is that it organically incorporates the advantages of the other prominent theories of the atonement. One thing that theories of the atonement such as Christus Victor and Healing theories have in common is that they integrate Jesus's mission on the cross with his ministry throughout his life. On the Christus Victor view, for instance, Jesus's death on the cross stands with Jesus's prophetic ministry and his miraculous healings as means by which Jesus combats and repels the power of sin. Such an integration is theologically desirable for, as Gerald O'Collins writes, "the fathers of the Church understood that all the stages of his incarnate history effected human redemption, and not merely his death on the cross" (2007, 82). Indeed, penal and satisfaction theories are sometimes objected to on the grounds that Jesus's life is important for our salvation only because he had to live for at least a little while in order to die on the cross for our sins.

The Communal Substitution Theory integrates Jesus's death on the cross with the rest of his ministry, and so avoids this objection to penal and satisfaction theories. In my fourth point on communal atonement in §2 I noted that the best sort of atonement will also somehow aim to improve the group so that wrongdoing of the relevant sort are less likely to happen in the future. A company better atones for its violation of pollution laws by setting up procedures and educational programs to help ensure that no further violations are committed. Similarly, Jesus's atonement would be better if he aimed to help the human community to better fulfill its duties towards God. Jesus's ministry as a whole—both during his earthly life and after his resurrection—can be understood as aiming at precisely this. Jesus's parables and teaching show how we ought to truly follow God's will (e.g., by sacrificial love of God and our fellow humans). His various symbolic actions (e.g., turning over the tables in the Temple) cast judgment on those who stand in the way of truly fulfilling our duties towards God. His healings and exorcisms can be understood to combat the effects of sin and to show the kind of world we will live in if we fulfill our duties. His resurrection is a declaration that, by following Jesus's ways, sin will be defeated and humans as a community will act rightly and be reconciled with God. Such a declaration can give humans confidence in following Jesus's ways. Pentecost—the

See, e.g., Rom. 8:3, Hebrews 9 and 10, and also, arguably, Rom. 3:21-26, 2 Cor. 5:21, and 1 John 2:1-2.

Joel Green 2006 objects to the penal theory on such grounds, although he phrases the objection somewhat differently than I do here.
gift of the Holy Spirit—is Jesus’s means for continuing to guide his followers in serving God and fellow humans appropriately. Since some of these actions are ways of combatting sin—the primary aim of atonement according to Christus Victor theories—and others are ways of healing humans and producing shalom—the primary aim according to Healing theories—the Communal Substitution Theory naturally incorporates not only the general idea that Jesus’s entire ministry affects human salvation, but also the more specific aspects of salvation emphasized by the Christus Victor theory and the Healing View. Furthermore, since the goal is to influence the human community to better fulfill its duties towards God, the central element of the Moral Influence Theory is also incorporated into the Communal Substitution Theory. Jesus’s life and death provide a model in various ways for how humans ought to live. Insofar as Jesus’s model inspires (perhaps with assistance from the Holy Spirit) humans to live appropriately, Jesus’s life and death help the human community better fulfill its duties towards God.

4. Some Objections

I now turn to consider three objections to the Communal Substitution Theory. The first is an objection directly to the communal component of the theory. The other two are objections to penal and satisfaction theories more generally.

Objection 1. “The Communal Substitution Theory assumes that there is a human community. But there isn’t. There are a bunch of separate human communities, but there is no semi-organized structure of authority that would bind these separate human communities together into a single human community. At best it is metaphorical to speak of the human community.”

Reply. I will offer two very different replies to this objection. First, there are many different kinds of communities, with different degrees of organized structure, and groups of people that lack any sort of organized structure of authority—indeed, whose members have no significant relations—can have collective responsibilities. Consider again the example described earlier of a professor who divides his students into groups and gives each group an assignment. Each group has a set of collective responsibilities even though each group has no organized structure, and indeed despite the fact the members of a given group may have no prior relationships with each other. On the Christian view, the group of humans is quite similar to a class group. God creates humans and gives them, as a group, a set of responsibilities. They can fulfill these responsibilities in many ways using many

27 Reichenbach (2006a) defends a Healing theory.
28 Made famous by Abelard. Grensted (1920) discusses both Abelard’s views and those of later Moral Influence theorists. Quinn (1993) contains a speculative development of Abelard’s view that might avoid some of the traditional objections to these kinds of views.
29 See Held (1970) for a famous defense of this claim.
different communal structures, just as a classroom group can fulfill its collective responsibilities while developing a variety of different communal structures. They could try to form one, or many separate, organized communities. Perhaps it is a bit of a stretch to consider the group of all humans as a community; the concept of a community may require that the members of a community have some sort of thicker relationships than bare membership in a biological category. I’m not sure about this. But, nothing in my theory hangs on the term “community.” The theory merely assumes that the group of humans on earth throughout history has a set of collective responsibilities and that it fails to fulfill these responsibilities; it doesn’t matter whether this group has thick enough interrelations to count as a community in the conventional sense.

Second, there is an alternative way of developing the Communal Substitution Theory that would avoid this objection altogether. Instead of Jesus atoning for the sins of the human community, he atones for the sins of Israel. Israel is a collective entity and a community, and thus can have collective responsibilities. Israel’s sins are atoned for and individuals can have their sins forgiven by repenting and committing themselves to the gospel way of life. The community of people doing this forms the Church. So, on this view, the Church is the true extension of the pre-Christian community of Israel. Jesus’s atonement is “for everyone” in the sense that everyone can be reconciled to God by repenting of their sins and becoming members of the Church. Theologically and Biblically, there is something to be said for this way of developing the theory— it explains why Jesus’s ministry is primarily to the Jews and also why parts of the New Testament emphasize that Jesus is a descendent of David (to mention just two reasons). Plainly this alternative way of understanding the theory requires further development, but it has some initial promise and, if true, would entirely avoid this first objection.

Objection 2. “The New Testament depicts God as forgiving, without requiring reparation. The Lord’s Prayer asks for divine forgiveness, assuming only that we will also forgive others. In the parable of the prodigal son, the father forgives the son without requiring anything by way of satisfaction; indeed, the son was quite prepared to offer satisfaction, but the father forgave him before he could even offer it. So, not only is it possible for God to forgive without requiring punishment or satisfaction, it looks like (as the New Testament depicts him) God endorses this sort of forgiveness. But, the Communal Substitution Theory assumes that aspects of Jesus’s life and death constitute a sort punishment or satisfaction for communal sin. The theory thus conflicts with the way the New Testament depicts God’s forgiveness.”

Reply. A full answer to this objection would require a detailed interpretation of various relevant biblical texts; I’m no biblical scholar and in any case lack the

30 See Wright (1996) for an argument that Jesus understood his ministry to be aimed at redeeming the nation of Israel.
31 This objection has been raised in a variety of forms by many people, including Hick (1994, 256-7), Boyd (2006b, 104), and Reichenbach (2006b, 106-8).
space for such a project. I’ll make two points in reply; although the objection merits
more discussion, I believe my response raises strong doubts about its force against
the Communal Substitution Theory.

First, the two texts mentioned are about rectifying individual sins. On the
Communal Substitution Theory, individual human sins are forgiven without any
need for the individual to offer a satisfaction or suffer punishment. So, the theory fits
with these passages quite well regarding individual sin: God simply forgives those
individuals who approach him in a spirit of repentance.

Second, I argued in §3 that although God could have simply forgiven the
human community, it was better for the community to accept punishment or offer
satisfaction. We can build on that defense by comparing individual atonement to
group atonement. Atonement has a goal—restoring, as far as possible, the
relationship between the offender and the victim. In many cases, it is clear to the
victim that an individual offender has repented of their wrongdoing. In many such
cases, it seems perfectly appropriate to simply forgive the offender because the goal
of restoration of the relationship is clearly in the process of being achieved.
However, in cases where the offender is a group, it is usually far from clear that the
group has repented of its wrongdoing. Indeed, it isn’t even really clear what it is
for the group to repent. The best, perhaps only, way the group can repent is precisely by
suffering a punishment or offering satisfaction, and by the members of the group
individually repenting and identifying with the group’s punishment or satisfaction.
Until the victim can be fairly confident that repentance has genuinely been given, it
seems inappropriate to forgive because the victim would lack grounds for thinking
that the relationship is in the process of being restored. Since, as I’ve just argued,
such repentance can best, or perhaps only, be had or shown by the group suffering
punishment or offering satisfaction, the victim shouldn’t forgive a group wrong
unless the group has suffered punishment or offered satisfaction.

Objection 3. “According to this theory God intentionally uses violence to bring
about the atonement for and redemption of humans. On a penal version, Jesus’s
death is a punishment suffered for the sins of the group. On a satisfaction version,
Jesus’s life and death is the best kind of satisfaction that humans could have offered.
Either way, Jesus’s violent death is accepted by God as a part of the atonement for
the sins of the human community. But, this is morally abominable for two reasons.
First, a good God would never use violence as a means for redemption; he would at
most accept it as a necessary or inevitable byproduct of his plan. A God who uses his
son’s death in this way would be guilty of child abuse.32 Second, God’s accepting
Jesus’s death in this way would ‘glorify innocent suffering and encourage people to
passively accept roles as surrogate sufferers for others “in imitation of Christ”’
(Heim 2006, 25).33 But, accepting such a role would lead many—women, children,
the poor in certain governments—to suffer abuse at the hands of oppressors, which
would be wrong.

33 Heim is merely describing a kind of objection offered by others, such as Brown and Parker (1989).
Reply. As with objection 2, there are a lot of issues here that I can’t fully address. Nevertheless, I believe its force can be blunted. Take the second argument first. I don’t see how it follows from God accepting the suffering of Jesus as a penal substitute or satisfaction that the rest of us humans should accept whatever suffering comes our way, particularly if we’re being abused. Indeed, it is fundamental to the Communal Substitution Theory that Jesus took the punishment (or offered satisfaction), and that we don’t have to, and in fact that we couldn’t have done so because none of us non-divine humans adequately represent the group. Now, it is certainly true that Christians have encouraged people to be Christlike in enduring suffering for others; the apostles themselves endured suffering for the gospel on multiple occasions. But, it surely doesn’t follow that we always ought to endure suffering. It might be right, for example, to endure verbal abuse, without retaliation, from a coworker who is simply having a bad day in the hopes that ‘taking the high ground’ will help the coworker to see that he is in the wrong, but it doesn’t follow that a physically and emotionally abused wife should just endure the abuse and hope that her endurance is a witness to her husband. It would be right for her to get out of the relationship and nothing about the Communal Substitution Theory entails otherwise.

Now for the first argument. First, is it really the case that God wouldn’t use violence in any circumstances? We sometimes think it is appropriate to use violence (e.g. to prevent other violence). If the salvation of the human race is at stake and the best way to bring it about involves a measure of violence, would it really be wrong to do so? It doesn’t seem so to me, although perhaps it depends on details about the violence that is involved. This leads to my second point. On the theory of atonement I have developed, God doesn’t use violence in the sense of directly causing violence in the world to obtain some good result. Rather, God allows some violence to happen, and accepts that violent act as part of what it takes to bring about reconciliation and salvation. Furthermore, we must remember that the atonement should be understood in the context of the doctrine of the Trinity. God himself experiences death on the cross. God isn’t sending somebody else to take care of it; he does it himself. In addition, the second person of the Trinity, Jesus, voluntarily accepts this role. If the atonement were a matter of God employing somebody else, sending them to die a violent death, all for the benefits of other people, then the atonement would seem morally questionable because God would be using someone simply as a means to an end. But, if the atonement is (as my theory suggests) a matter of God himself voluntarily enduring a violent death in order to benefit others, then it doesn’t seem morally questionable. At least, it can’t be objected to on the grounds that God uses someone simply as a means to an end, and it isn’t immediately evident what else would be morally questionable about such an action.

5. Conclusion

I have developed a new theory of the atonement on which Jesus’s life and death atones for the sins of the human community. Jesus’s life and death on the
cross can be understood as either a punishment or a satisfaction for the sins of the human community. Every individual sin contributes to violation of humanity’s communal duty to God; in virtue of Jesus’s atonement for the sins of the community, individuals in the community can be forgiven for their individual sins by repenting, apologizing, and recommitting themselves to fulfilling the human communal duties to God.

The Communal Substitution Theory has a variety of virtues. It avoids the Justice Worry for penal and satisfaction views, thus showing that these views can be defended if developed as the Communal Substitution Theory suggests. It well-explains a variety of theological claims and fits well with various scriptural passages, including notably the New Testament comparison of Jesus’s sacrifice to the Day of Atonement. The theory naturally incorporates the advantages of the other prominent theories of the atonement. Finally, the theory avoids some other objections to penal and satisfaction views.

Like any novel large theory, the Communal Substitution Theory needs further examination before it can be reasonably believed. It raises lots of interesting issues about communal responsibility, individual responsibility, the relations between the two, and about what role these ideas play in scripture and theology. One would like to work out the implications of this theory on these and other issues before coming to a judgment about its adequacy. However, for the reasons summarized above, the theory shows a lot of promise; in particular, its ability to explain a wide range of theological claims suggests it may have further untapped explanatory potential.34 I hope to have shown that the Communal Substitution Theory is plausible and promising enough to warrant and motivate further such inquiry.35

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34 For example, I suspect it forges interesting connections to ecclesiology, the notion of the body of Christ, and to the idea of mystical union with Christ. It may also provide resources for elucidating the notion of original sin.

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