Hebrew Philosophy or Jewish Theology? A False Dichotomy

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Yoram Hazony’s book, *The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture* (2012), is a clarion call to engage with the philosophical content of the Hebrew Bible. The book’s champions rank among my most cherished religious and academic heroes (Rabbi Jonathan Sacks and Eleonore Stump). Having spent a year as a post-doctoral fellow at Yoram’s research institute, I have long been impressed by his razor sharp intellect and his passion for bringing Jewish philosophy into a new and more vibrant age. But, in my opinion, the book is host to a number of serious flaws. So, in the collegial spirit with which Yoram closes his book, putting down his pen to ‘hear what others have to say and especially to see what others can contribute to this, our joint project’ (pg. 259), I will concentrate in these few pages upon some of my concerns, which culminate with the false dichotomy I fear he presents us between approaching the Hebrew Bible as a work of Hebrew philosophy or as a work of Jewish theology.

1. Theory of Truth

Trading on the fact that the word for ‘word’ and the word for ‘object’ are identical in Biblical Hebrew (*davar*), Hazony argues that the whole distinction between truth-bearers and truth-makers would have been anathema to the authors of the Hebrew Bible. He claims that the authors of the Hebrew Bible (or many of them) were committed to something like a pragmatic theory of truth.

The Hebrew word for truth is a cognate of the Hebrew word for *faithfulness*. Accordingly, the Hebrew Bible will often describe objects as being *true* if they are in some sense or other faithful, steadfast or reliable. What does the Bible mean when it describes a tent-peg as being true/faithful/reliable (Isaiah 22:23)? A tent-peg is true if it is ‘what a tent-peg ought to be (in our estimation) in the face of the stresses and strains of the storm’ (pg. 201). More generally, Hazony is committed to the notion that:

[I]n the Hebrew Bible, that which is true is that which proves, in the face of time and circumstance, to be what it ought; whereas that which is false is that which fails, in the face of time and circumstance, to be what it ought. (pg. 201)

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1 If I give page numbers without any other details, it is this book that I am citing.
At the beginning of Deuteronomy 16, we are told what to do in the face of a claim/rumour that idolatry has taken place. We are told to investigate the claim diligently. But, because the word for ‘claim’ and the word for ‘matter’ or ‘thing’ is the same in Hebrew, once again, davar, there is an in-built ambiguity. Are we to investigate the claim, or the matter; the rumour, or the incident itself? Hazony responds:

The answer, it would appear, is that this is a false choice forced upon us by the dualism of word and object presupposed by the correspondence theory [of truth]. In fact, the davar in question is the act of idolatry as it is conceived or understood by the authorities upon hearing of it. The question that is being addressed when the authorities investigate the rumor is whether the object before their minds upon hearing the report – the act of idolatry as they understand it to be – will prove to be what it ought to be in the course of a thorough investigation of the matter. (pg. 212)

An act of idolatry, in order to be an act of idolatry, ought to have certain properties. In the case at hand, we have an act understood to be an act of idolatry. If that act, as we understand it, appears, upon testing and further investigation, to have the properties that an act of idolatry ought to have, then the rumour was true just as the act was a true act of idolatry. If not, then the rumour was false, and the act was a false act of idolatry.2

Non-correspondence theories of truth often end up presupposing the notion of truth rather than actually defining it. Bertrand Russell famously made this claim against coherence theories of truth. Crudely put, a coherence theory suggests that a proposition is true iff it coheres with the members of a certain set of propositions. Russell’s problem was that you could take any false proposition, p, and create a set of propositions, s, with which it coheres, for there is no reason why ‘a system of false propositions might not, as in a good novel, be just as coherent as the system which is the whole of truth’ (Russell, 1906-7, pg. 34). So, the question we have to ask is, what makes it the case that membership in, or coherence with, s is not sufficient for truth, when membership in, or coherence with, some other set, t, is? What is the salient difference between sets s and t, if not that t is the set of true propositions and that s is not? Coherence with t isn’t really what makes p true so much as the fact that t is the set of true propositions. Our definition of truth is circular. In trying to define truth, we end up appealing to the set of true propositions.

A similar objection can be raised with what Hazony thinks to be the Biblical account of truth. I claim that Simon performed an act of idolatry. This apparently means that I have before me a certain act, Simon’s act,3 understood in a certain way,

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2 Indeed, an odd corollary of Hazony’s position is that every act that isn’t an act of idolatry is a false act of idolatry. This is no criticism, but an interesting observation. Right now I am performing an act of false idolatry, and false moon walking, and false hand-gliding, because I am performing an act of true article writing.

3 This is already strange. What happens if there was no act? What happens if Simon is fictional?
as being an act of idolatry. My claim will be true if the act before me, Simon’s act, turns out to be the sort of act that an act of idolatry ought to be. But this means that I must be pre-committed to the truth of a number of claims of the form, ‘acts of idolatry ought to be such that $\varphi$.’ But what does it mean for those claims to be true? I worry that here we stand at the edge of an infinite regress or have fallen into the sort of circularity that Russell alleged against coherentists. The regress gets going if we say that:

1. ‘Simon performed an act of idolatry’ is true iff the act in question has the properties that an act of idolatry ought to have.
2. Point 1 entails that there is some property, $\varphi$, such that acts of idolatry ought to have property $\varphi$.
3. ‘Acts of idolatry ought to have property $\varphi$’ is true iff the set of acts in question have the properties that the set of idolatrous acts ought to have.
4. Point 3 entails that there is some property, $\psi$, such that the set of idolatrous acts ought to have property $\psi$.
5. ‘The set of idolatrous acts ought to have property $\psi$’ is true iff the set is the sort of thing that ought to have $\psi$.
6. Point 5 entails that there is some property, $\xi$, such that sets that have property $\psi$ ought to have property $\xi$ … and so on, and so forth...

The best way out of this regress lands you in the grips of Russell’s circle. That is to say, your definition can explain what it means for ‘Simon performed an act of idolatry’ to be true. But, your definition tacitly utilizes the concept of *truth* had by the claim ‘acts of idolatry ought to have property $\varphi$.’ And, that concept of truth isn’t unpacked by your definition, and can’t be unpacked for fear of regress. This echoes how the coherentist explains what it means for $p$ to be true in terms of cohering with set $t$, but cannot explain what it means for $t$ to be the set of true propositions.

I have another concern with this theory of truth. Hazony is eager to say that there is no distinction between truth-bearing and truth-makers (pg. 217). It’s not so much that there is no distinction between objects as they are and objects as they are understood, but that we actually live in ‘a world consisting of objects as understood, in which there is no reality that is genuinely independent of our own mind’ (Hazony 2012, pg. 217-8). There are no things as they are, there are only things as they are understood. But, if this is the case, it’s really not clear to me that Hazony can give us a coherent account of falsehood.

Surely what it means for my claim that Simon performed an act of idolatry to be false is for my understanding of the act in question to be out of kilter with the act itself (if there was any act at all). This can’t be Hazony’s account, for it utilizes a distinction that he seeks to collapse. Instead, he might claim that my belief proved itself to be unreliable, as contrary evidence mounted. My belief that Simon performed an act of idolatry became a belief that he was innocent as my understanding of his act shifted, in light of evidence. But now we have two questions: (1) what caused my understanding to shift, if not something outside of my understanding; if not a dawning realization that my understanding of the act and
the act itself were out of kilter, and (2), on Hazony’s account of falsehood, what exactly can we point to and call false? By the time I want to call my understanding of Simon’s act false, my understanding has changed.

The identity theory of truth falls into similar problems. The identity theory of truth asserts that a true belief is one whose object is a fact. A proposition is true, when it is identical to a fact. Like Hazony’s theory, the identity theory of truth is motivated by a desire to collapse the distinction between the world and its representation. But, if there are no such things as propositions, and true beliefs have facts as their objects, what are the objects of false beliefs? Like the identity theory, Hazony can’t actually give us a convincing account of falsehood unless he is willing to concede that a thing and the way that that thing is understood can differ. Unfortunately, to make such a concession is to concede that falsehood resides in a lack of correspondence between things as they really are and things as they are understood to be.

One more concern echoes Russell’s most famous criticism of pragmatic accounts of truth (cf. Russell 1910). His fear was that pragmatists were confusing an indicator of truth with its essence. Of course, true beliefs are generally going to be the ones that end up being reliable, steadfast, useful, etc. But the question is why? To be told that true beliefs are reliable because that’s what it means for them to be true is to be robbed of an explanation. The correspondence theory is motivated by the desire to explain why it is that certain beliefs end up being more reliable or useful than others. It claims that the ones that end up being useful are the ones that faithfully represent the world as it is.

Hazony’s Biblical theory of truth falls into many of the pitfalls of the coherence theory, the identity theory and the pragmatic theory, with few of the virtues of any of them. Furthermore, the fact that the word ‘faithful’ can be used to describe a tight correspondence (as I used it in the last sentence of the last paragraph) indicates that some of Hazony’s linguistic data was less decisive than he thought it to be. That Biblical Hebrew treats ‘truth’ and ‘faithfulness’ as cognates indicates nothing about its preference between pragmatic and correspondence accounts of truth. This isn’t to say that I’m here endorsing a correspondence theory. In fact, Hazony’s claim that the correspondence theory is the default position of the philosophical tradition is far from certain. From Frege’s theory of truth (Frege 1918), to the primitivism of the early Russell and Moore (cf. Assay 2013), to the deflationary account of Paul Horwich (2001) – all of which could be read into the cryptic comments of Aristotle – the story is much more nuanced.

2. Theory of Revelation

These considerations lead me to my next, more fundamental, concern with Hazony’s book. Let’s assume that the Biblical authors, with no linguistic expression at their disposal for the distinction between words and objects, were really

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4 Cf. David 2001
unwilling and perhaps unable, to think in terms of a correspondence theory of truth. And, let’s assume that Hazony has given a very accurate account of the theory of truth held by the authors of the Bible. But, let’s further assume, on the back of my brief discussion above, that that theory of truth is host to a number of serious problems. What are we, as members of the Jewish or Christian faith, to do?

I would presume that God, even the imperfect God of Hazony’s Biblical theology (cf. Hazony 2012b), is better at metaphysics than his human partners in the authorship of the Biblical texts. The human authors, given their linguistic constraints and their not having the lessons of centuries of systematic philosophy to draw from, may have been thinking in terms of Hazony’s monistic pragmatism. But, if that monistic pragmatism is host to defects, we might well think that God, the better metaphysician, was thinking in other terms.

Hazony makes two claims that are, in the end, relevant here. First, he claims that if we have to think of the Bible in terms of the Reason versus Revelation dichotomy, we would do better to think of it in terms of a book of Reason than in terms of a book of Revelation. Secondly, he claims that we’d be better off getting rid of, or transcending, the dichotomy altogether. This second claim is based upon his idea that once you’ve demolished the dualism of contemporary philosophy that distinguishes between words and objects, and ‘inside’ perspectives and ‘outside’ perspectives, you can no longer hold onto the scholastic notion of prophecy and revelation as ‘a unilateral inpouring of the truth from outside’ (pg. 261). Hazony goes on to argue that the Bible’s own accounts of revelation involve the prophet coming to see things for himself. If anything, God inspires the questions, but doesn’t give us the answers.

On the other hand, Hazony doesn’t deny the possibility that God speaks to prophets, and that this leads to ‘miraculous knowledge’ (pg. 264). And thus, I am left thinking that Hazony hasn’t gone far enough in thinking about the different things that revelation can mean, before he comes to his conclusion that:

[W]ithout the metaphysical scheme that was used to underwrite the medieval conception of revelation, I’m afraid this term just isn’t going to be left with much meaning to it... (pg. 264).

But, even on Hazony’s metaphysical scheme, I can still offer a number of competing accounts that would give real flesh to the notion of revelation. It could simply be knowledge arrived at via Divine testimony. That would be a significant category since, despite his imperfections, even Hazony’s God is probably a very trustworthy source of information. That I was told something about ipads by Steve Jobs is relevant to the reliability of that information. Likewise, that I was told something about the universe by its creator.

But, what would it mean for a book to be a work of revelation? On this picture, it could mean that it was dictated by God. Of course, the Hebrew Bible doesn’t make this claim, and even Jewish Orthodoxy only makes that claim (or a related claim) about the Pentateuch. Modern evangelical thinkers have argued for the notion of double authorship. This idea goes all the way back to Philo, and has it that God, so to speak, manipulates human authors to write the words that he wants...
them to write. Revelation as divinely inspired literature, on the other hand, thinks of God actively seeking to inspire authors to write certain things. I don’t see why any of these competing and distinct conceptions of revelation (divine dictation, double authorship or divine inspiration) are rendered impotent, irrelevant, or outmoded once you adopt Hazony’s monistic pragmatism.

On the double authorship view, and on the Divine inspiration view, you can meaningfully distinguish between what the authors of the text thought they were writing – what the words meant to them – and what God actually meant to convey. So, going back to our example, the Biblical authors may have understood the metaphysics of truth as Hazony thinks they did (I’ll assume this for the sake of argument), but that doesn’t mean that that’s what God meant to inspire or convey – especially if he is a better metaphysician than they were. In a similar vein, you might think that a certain generation of authors and readers would have looked at the words ‘an eye for an eye’ and thought that the injunction was literally to take eyes for eyes. But, you might also think that the later, more humane, Rabbinic interpretation was more true to what God meant when he revealed that verse to his human co-author.

I once asked Hazony a question that sought to distinguish, in just this way, between what the authors may have thought, and what God wants us to glean from the text. Hazony didn’t buy the presupposition of the question. He responded with a counter-question, ‘what does God want you to glean from reading Plato?’ My response was that the triadic relation between God, Plato and Plato’s written works is not the same as the triadic relation between God, the authors of the Bible, and the Hebrew Bible. Hazony disagreed. God’s role in the genesis of Plato’s cannon was no different to his role in the genesis of the Biblical cannon. On my understanding of things, that places him a long way outside of the Jewish religious tradition.

Admittedly, I think it could be a very interesting project to uncover the metaphysics and epistemology of the Biblical authors, without paying one bit of attention to the Jewish tradition, and its Oral Torah, which has, according to Orthodox Jewish doctrine, preserved and further revealed to us elements of the Divine intention behind the words of the Pentateuch. You could inquire, shutting that tradition out to one side, what the original authors might have thought. The Talmud charmingly imagines Moses not understanding the words that Rabbi Akiva expounds and propounds in Moses’ own name (Babylonian Talmud, tractate Menachot, 29b). We could ask, what would Moses have thought his words meant before Rabbi Akiva got his teeth into them? That’s certainly an interesting project. We could seek to relate to Hazony’s book in those terms.

Unfortunately, I think that that won’t work either. To engage in that deeply historical task, I think you’d have to pay much more attention to the history of the composition of the text. Jon Levenson (2012) wrote a damning critique of Hazony’s book. Some of the critique was unfair. I think Levenson didn’t do justice to the insightful typological and symbolic readings that Hazony develops with some mastery. On the other hand, I think he’s right in his central claim. If, like Hazony (pg. 37), you think that Genesis to II Kings, was redacted by Jeremiah or one of his associates, using a number of pre-existing texts that were welded together, then you can’t just ask, what did the author mean when he wrote these words? You have to
take a more layered approach. Hazony thinks that this would amount to researching the trees but never the forest (Hazony 2013). That retort is unfair.

Levenson’s approach is to try to understand all of the different layers of meanings and agendas that were held by the various people allegedly involved in the composition of the texts, and then to understand the various agendas of the people allegedly involved in cobbling those different textual traditions together at different times. So, if you don’t want to look at Hazony’s book as an attempt at traditional Jewish philosophy, but as an attempt to uncover how the ancient Hebrew authors might have understood their own words before people like Rabbi Akiva got their teeth into them, then I think that Hazony’s work will likely be found to fall short for methodological reasons.

3. Judaism and Christianity

As a Jewish philosopher who believes that God’s revelatory work was involved in the genesis of the Hebrew Bible, and in the Oral Torah that developed in its wake, I am much more interested than most academic Biblical scholars in what the text as a whole has to say to us. And, to that end, people will find tremendous (though sometimes contentious) suggestions in Yoram’s book about the ethics of the shepherd versus the ethics of the farmer. And, indeed, despite believing in the importance of the category of revelation, I can agree that it’s imperative for us to view the Bible as making important contributions to the philosophical world. I look to Michael Walzer (1986, 2012) and R. Jonathan Sacks (2001) as tremendous exemplars of how one can try to build a political philosophy from the text of the Bible, and I certainly agree with Hazony that source criticism can be irrelevant, or even distracting, if that is your goal. Nevertheless, I don’t seek to find the last word on God’s message to us in the words of the Hebrew Bible. Indeed, those very words can be deceptive, if not viewed through the prism of tradition – take ‘an eye for an eye’ as an example!

There is a radical Midrash (Tanchuma, Teruma 8) that compares the written words of the Torah to a temptress seeking to lead the people astray, and adjures us to turn to the words of the Torah only through the prism of rabbinic interpretation (the Midrash is a daring play on Proverbs 5, and casts scripture in the role of the seductive evil woman, and casts rabbinic interpretation and tradition in the role of wisdom). Hazony ignores the message of that Midrash.

Keith Mathison (2001) has made efforts to distinguish between Christian philosophy in the mode of sola scriptura, which places ultimate authority on the words of Scripture without ignoring generations of Christian tradition, and what he calls solo scriptura, the outlandish attempt to develop a Christian philosophy without paying any heed to the Church fathers, councils or creeds. Hazony’s whole enterprise strikes me as an attempt at Jewish philosophy in the mode of solo scriptura. For that reason, it can barely be called a Jewish philosophy at all. It is more reminiscent of the Karaites; or, it is an attempt to develop a Hebrew philosophy in contradistinction to a Jewish philosophy.
This leads me to my final point. The book adopts an overwhelmingly anti-Christian tone. More often than not, if there’s a wrong way to read the Bible in Hazony’s eyes, he will call it a Christian way. This happens too often for me to document; so often that one starts to read ‘Christian,’ in Hazony’s idiolect, as synonymous with ‘profoundly wrongheaded’. I will share with you one example. If you read the story of the aborted sacrifice of Isaac and think that there is actually some sense in which God wanted Abraham to sacrifice his son, then you are, apparently, infected with Christian ways of thinking (pg. 115).

Hazony thinks that the key lesson of the aborted sacrifice of Isaac is that God is teaching us that he doesn’t want human sacrifice. I have heard this teaching gleaned from this episode by philosophers and Rabbis who I admire without bounds. And yet, for my part, I find that reading of this episode deeply confusing. If God wanted to teach you not to φ, isn’t it a very peculiar pedagogic strategy to command somebody to φ, before stopping them at the last minute in order to show them how much you don’t want them to do it? If I want to teach you about the evils of adultery, I’m not going to command you to commit adultery, and then wait until the very last minute before I tell you to stop. That would be a very strange way of trying to convey my message.

More than confusing, Hazony’s reading is confused. He argues that besides teaching us about God’s dislike of human sacrifice, the binding of Isaac was designed to test whether Abraham would, in principle, be willing to give up on his own self-interests in the name of a greater good; in the name of God. I can understand this reading. It jives well with the text. But, Hazony continues to assure us that Abraham never had any intention of going through with the task and knew that God wasn’t going to demand real human sacrifice. Well, if that’s the case, in what sense did Abraham demonstrate that he would be willing to give up on his own self-interests in the name of a greater good? He knew all along that it was just a test!

Against ‘Christian readings’, Hazony insists that God had absolutely no desire for Isaac’s actual sacrifice. In one of the few footnotes to take note of rabbinic tradition, Hazony cites a famous Midrash to that end. He ends the footnote with the claim that he ‘hasn’t yet seen an opinion in the rabbinic literature that dissents from this view’ (pg. 311, ft. 79). But there is such a tradition, and it is a prominent one.

In various places, the Rabbis develop a legend to say that Isaac was actually sacrificed (these traditions are collected in Speigel 1967). How this could have been, since we see him in action later, is sometimes left to our imagination. Other Midrashim tell us that he was resurrected after the fact (cf. eg. Midrash Lekach Tov, Vayetze, Gen. 31:42). Either way, this tradition is made most famous by a Midrash quoted in Rashi’s commentary to Leviticus. At the end of the curses in the book of Leviticus (26:42) we are told: ‘I remember my covenant with Jacob, and also my covenant with Isaac, and also my covenant with Abraham will I remember; and I will remember the land.’ Memory in that verse is explicitly invoked regarding Jacob, Abraham and the land of Israel, but not explicitly regarding Isaac. Rashi quotes a Midrash (Vayikra Rabba 36:5) that explains: God doesn’t need to remember Isaac because his ashes lie constantly before him on the altar. God relents from cursing the Jewish people for their sins in no small part because Isaac was sacrificed for their sins before being resurrected. The Rabbis can sound pretty Christological!
No doubt, this is a disturbing rabbinic tradition. It is related to the tradition that sees circumcision as a type of sacrifice, and animal sacrifice as a type of substitution, because in some profound sense, we should really be giving everything up for God, including our lives. We are not worthy, and to pour our blood out before the Lord is, in some sense, appropriate were it not for our other duties.

The Hebrew Bible is many things. It contains immeasurable wisdom, and should be a part of our conversation in political philosophy, ethics, metaphysics and epistemology. With that, Hazony and I can agree. But the Bible, wedded to an interpretative tradition, is also part of a religious life that is about deep interpersonal relationships between man and God – a relationship that is at times mysterious and absurd, despite Hazony’s attack on the mystery and absurdity at the heart of a certain type of faith (chapter 8) – a relationship that we don’t and cannot feel fully worthy to take on. Hazony’s inability to look at the binding of Isaac through what he takes to be Christian eyes, speaks to his lack of appreciation of this dimension of the Biblical literature. It seems to me that some of Hazony’s disdain for Christianity is that Christianity is too Jewish for this Hebrew philosopher.

In summary, I worry that the book’s conception of truth is deeply flawed. Even if the Biblical authors intended to convey this theory of truth, it would still be a separate question as to whether this is what God intended. Hazony thinks that that question is irrelevant, but that’s because he doesn’t think that God had a special role to play in the genesis of the Hebrew Bible. That fact places Hazony’s thought outside of the Jewish religious tradition. But, if you want to relate to his project as the attempt to uncover what the ancient Hebrew’s thought, as opposed to what contemporary Judaism should think, then we should worry about Levenson’s methodological concerns.

Hazony, the director of the Jewish analytic theology program in Jerusalem, takes himself to be building an authentic Jewish philosophy (not merely uncovering history). He regularly opposes wrong-headed ‘Christian’ readings with his ‘Jewish’ readings. But, his philosophy is akin to solo scriptura. Christian philosophy with no concern at all for the Nicene Creed or Aquinas would struggle to be Christian at all. Hazony’s philosophy likewise struggles to be Jewish at all. It is more accurately described as neo-Israelite. Finally, its anti-Christian rhetoric points to an aloofness from embodied religious life and experience, which disables him from appreciating a key dimension of the Hebrew scriptures as they have been understood by generations of Jews.

Nonetheless, there is much to commend this book to the wider public. Hebrew (or Neo-Israelite) philosophy is tremendously impressive. Its political philosophy, to which Hazony dedicates a chapter, was remarkably influential over the political philosophers of the modern age. What would the thought of Locke be without the Hebrew Bible? Indeed, I was sorry not to see more political philosophy: a description of the Hebrew economics of mass redistribution of wealth, and an exploration of the radical Hebrew views regarding land-holdings.

But, there is a sense in which Hazony’s book, with its disdain for revelation and its aloofness from deeply felt relationship with God, forces a choice upon you: you can have your Hebrew philosophy, but only at the expense of Jewish theology; you can take the Hebrew Bible as a book of reason, but only if you write God
completely out of its authorship. For Hazony, the Hebrew Bible has to become exactly the same as the works of Plato, from a theological point of view, before you can read it as a work of reason. And yet, if I had to make a choice between Hebrew philosophy and Jewish theology (which I take to be a false dichotomy) I would choose Jewish theology every time. Thank goodness that we needn’t make such a choice. The Bible contains wisdom that can speak to theists and atheists alike, but also contains layers of meaning that will forever be locked away to those who are insensitive to the music of religious experience.

Bibliography


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