On the an-enhypostasia distinction and three-part concrete-nature Christology: The divine preconscious model

Andrew Loke
Hong Kong University

Abstract: Oliver Crisp argues that the an-enhypostasia distinction should be understood according to a three-part concrete-nature Christology. Nevertheless, his attempt to maintain the anhypostasia-enhypostasia distinction in accordance with Two-Consciousnesses Model seems unsatisfactory, for this model faces certain problems concerning Christ’s self-consciousness and the possibility of an I-Thou relationship between the divine and human consciousnesses. I argue that the Divine Preconscious Model provides an alternative, novel account of three-part concrete-nature Christology which avoids these and other problems, and which maintains the anhypostasia-enhypostasia distinction as follows: the human nature (the aspect of his consciousness which had human properties, his human preconscious and human body) did not exist as a person independent of its assumption by the Word (anhypostasia), while from the first moment of the Incarnation the human nature existed “in” a particular person (enhypostasia).

1. Introduction

In his recent writings, Oliver Crisp argues that the an-enhypostasia distinction “makes most sense according to a concrete-nature view of the Incarnation, coupled with a three-part Christology” (Crisp 2007, 75). He distinguishes between two versions of abstract-nature accounts—realist and trope—and observes that

“There is a price to pay whichever of these two versions of an abstract nature view one adopts. The realist version may make sense of the anhypostatic aspect, but at the cost of saying nothing that is not plainly an entailment of a realist theory of properties. And, although this view is compatible with one peculiar or gerrymandered way of thinking about the enhypostatic aspect of the an-enhypostasia distinction, it is so at the cost of appearing theologically insubstantial.”(Crisp 2007, 76-79)

As for the trope account, he notes that “If Christ’s human nature is a set of particulars rather than universals, it does make sense to say that the Word hypostatizes or personalizes these properties” (Crisp 2007, 78).
He argues that

Matters are somewhat different if we assume that human natures are concrete particulars...What is assumed at the Incarnation, according to this view, is a particular human nature, not merely human nature per se (that is, taken as a universal)...on this three-part view... it is not true to say merely that Christ has the properties that comprise some universal that is human nature. Rather, what we should say is that he has a human body and human soul distinct from the Word that form a concrete particular that is his human nature. But this concrete particular has certain properties that are held in common with other human beings, as well as those properties that are peculiar to Christ, such as being born to Mary in a Bethlehem stable in 4 BC. (Crisp 2007, 79-82)

He concludes that

Three part Christologists are able to account for the intuition (that is, the fundamental apprehension) behind the an-enhypostasia distinction that the human nature of Christ is “impersonal” in one sense (Christ has those properties necessary and sufficient for being human, just as all human beings do), and “personalized” or “hypostatized” in that union (the human nature being a concrete particular that the Word assumes). (Crisp 2007, 83)

Crisp’s analysis of the an-enhypostasia distinction is brilliant, lucid and insightful. I agree with his conclusion that the an-enhypostasia distinction should be understood according to a three-part concrete-nature Christology (Crisp 2007, 75). Nevertheless, his attempt to maintain the anhypostasia-enhypostasia distinction in accordance with Two-Consciousnesses Model seems unsatisfactory (Crisp 2011), for this model faces certain problems concerning Christ’s self-consciousness and the possibility of an I-Thou relationship between the divine and human consciousnesses (Loke 2013, section 3). To elaborate, philosopher Tim Bayne observes that one would assume that Christ’s “I” thoughts had the same referent irrespective of the consciousnesses in which they were tokened, and surely it would be possible for Christ to think of himself (as himself) in either of his consciousnesses (Bayne 2001, 136). Thus, the Two Consciousnesses model would entail that the Logos having his human range of consciousness was consciously aware of himself being consciously unaware of the day of his coming (Mark 13:32). At the same time, the Logos having his divine range of consciousness was aware of himself being consciously aware of the day of his coming. In other words, the Logos would be aware of himself being consciously aware of the day of his coming, and aware of himself being consciously unaware of the day of his coming at the same time. He would have self-consciousness SC1: “I am aware of myself being consciously aware of the day of my coming,” and simultaneously self-consciousness SC2: “I am aware of myself being consciously unaware of the day of my coming.” A proponent of the Two-
Consciousnesses Model might argue that the Logos could be aware of two different things simultaneously just as a person can be at present aware of a computer in front of him/her and of the noise of the traffic simultaneously.\(^1\) In response, awareness of a computer and awareness of the noise of the traffic do not entail contradictory SCs and therefore they can coexist in the same self simultaneously. By contrast, the problem here is that “myself being consciously aware” occurs in SC1 and “myself being consciously unaware” occurs in SC2, and that these two self-consciousnesses are contradictory and therefore cannot exist in the same self simultaneously. To say that there are two contradictory self-consciousnesses simultaneously is to say there are two selves.

It might be objected that one could avoid two simultaneous and contradictory self-consciousnesses by saying “The Logos is aware of himself being consciously unaware of the day of his coming in his human nature, and aware of himself being consciously aware of the day of his coming in his divine nature at one-and-the-same time.” The objector might argue that with the reduplicative qualifications in italics, the contradiction is resolved, and that on this view there would be one subject with two ranges of consciousness (or perhaps two minds that token the one consciousness of the Logos), hence it is not the case that there are two selves. However, this view seems to amount to postulating three consciousnesses:

1. The human consciousness of his human nature in which the Logos might say “I am not aware of myself being consciously aware of the day of my coming”,
2. The divine consciousness of his divine nature in which the Logos might say “I am aware of myself being consciously aware of the day of my coming”, and
3. The subject consciousness of the Logos in which he might say “I am aware of myself being consciously unaware of the day of my coming in my human nature, and aware of myself being consciously aware of the day of my coming in my divine nature, at one-and-the-same time.”

This seems to make the problem worse rather than solving it, for now we have three different and contradictory self-consciousnesses— one in the human consciousness, one in the divine consciousness, and one in the “subject”— which seems to imply three selves.

Another problem with the Two Consciousnesses model is that it would seem that the human consciousness and the divine consciousness could encounter and address each other simultaneously, thus they could exist in a simultaneous I-Thou relationship to each other. But the possibility of such I-Thou relationship implies two persons (DeWeese 2007, 133-134).\(^2\) Hence, what follows from the Two

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\(^1\) I thank Richard Sturch for raising this line of thought in private correspondence.

\(^2\) cf. Richard Cross (2002a, 316), who, following Rahner, thinks that it is favourable to allow that the human Jesus and the Logos could engage in dialogue and conversation. Cross does not offer any reason why this is favourable, and neither does he engaged the vexing problem of I-thou relationship
Consciousnesses model is that Jesus would be two persons as affirmed by Nestorianism.

In what follows, I shall argue that the Divine Preconscious Model (DPM) of the Incarnation, developed from an earlier proposal by Oxford theologian William Sanday, can provide an alternative, novel account of three-part concrete-nature Christology which avoids these problems and offer insights on the related issues.

2. Explication of Key Terms

It will be useful to begin with an explication of key terms such as conscious, preconscious, personhood, essence, and nature. It should be noted that DPM assumes substance dualism (the view that the mind is a non-physical entity distinct from the physical body), and DPM postulates that the mind includes the conscious (used here as a noun) and the preconscious. These terms will be explained below.

The conscious and preconscious are well accepted notions in psychology and the following definitions of these terms are taken from Colman (2001), an authoritative dictionary of psychology.

The conscious is that which, when it is active, exhibits a mental condition characterized by the experience of perceptions, thoughts, feelings, awareness of the external world and often in humans, self-awareness (Colman 2001, 160).

The preconscious is defined as mental contents that are not currently in consciousness but are accessible to consciousness by directing attention to them (Colman 2001, 574). For example, a person might have knowledge of $2 + 2 = 4$ at time $t$, even though at $t$ he might not be consciously thinking about $2 + 2 = 4$. This knowledge of $2 + 2 = 4$ can be said to be in his preconscious: when he chooses to direct his attention to it, that is, when he chooses to consciously think about $2 + 2 = 4$, he can be aware of it.

The word “person” has a long and complicated history in discussions of Christian doctrine (Marenbon 2003, 71). “Person” came from the Latin persona, whose origins are traceable to Greek drama, where the prosōpon, or mask, became identified with the role an actor would assume in a given production, and it was introduced into theological discourse during the patristic period to clarify the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, the discussion of which were marred by confusion because of ambiguities in the philosophical and theological terminology (Williams and Bengtsson, 2010; Marenbon 2003, 71). The classic understanding of “person” in medieval theology was given by Boethius (ca. 480–524): “an individual

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that this would entail. There is, of course, no account of the human consciousness of Jesus addressing the divine Logos in the New Testament.


4 For suggestions of how DPM can modify Sanday’s model so as to address the objections raised by Sanday’s critics, see Loke (2012a).

5 For a defence of a dualist account of the Incarnation, see Loke (2012b).

6 For the theological legitimacy of utilizing psychological notions in Christology, see Loke (forthcoming a).
substance of a nature endowed with reason" (naturae rationabilis individua substantia) (Opuscula Sacra V, 3.171–172; see Marenbon 2003, 71). Despite the many centuries of development which the term has undergone, there are still some common elements between the use of “person” in the 5th century and the 21st century (O’Collins 2002, 73). Nevertheless, Boethius’s understanding has been criticized for neglecting the dynamic relation of the self to other selves (Torrance 2004, 199-211), while others have argued that static and non-relational features are by no means necessarily required by Aristotelian substance metaphysics (Alston 1999, 179-202). On the other hand, personhood cannot be understood as a totally relational matter, for the ontological question “what it is about persons that enable them to have such relationships which no other thing is able to have” needs to be addressed as well. Other philosophers emphasize the uniqueness of persons as “subjects”; in the modern sense, subjectivity depends primarily on the unity of self-consciousness, interiority, freedom, and personal autonomy, and it embraces the moral and religious dimensions, which are part and parcel of the person’s nature as a conscious, intelligent, free, willing subject in relation with others (Williams and Bengtsson, 2010). Thus, the property of being a person has been thought to involve various traits, including (moral) agency, reason or rationality, language or the cognitive skills language may support (such as intentionality and self-consciousness), and ability to enter into suitable relationship with other persons.  

An individual essence is defined as a cluster of properties essential for an individual being the particular entity it is, properties without which it would not exist (Morris 1989, 115).

A kind essence is defined as a cluster of properties without which an individual would not belong to the particular natural kind it distinctively exemplifies (Morris 1989, 115).

Concerning the term “nature” with respect to God Incarnate, this can be understood as either concrete or abstract (Crisp 2007, ch.2). On the concrete nature

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7 Alston also notes that “substance” has a range of meanings in philosophical and Christological discussions throughout the centuries. Hence, in order to minimize confusion I shall avoid using this word.

8 Adapted from Erickson (1998, 530), who raises it in relation to the image of God.

9 The traits described may be either actual or potential, and what is necessary for personhood is not that these traits are existent properties of the biological organism that is the person’s body (one would surely not wish to say that an adult who is asleep, for example, has ceased from being a person!), but rather the possession of the potential capacity for such properties and powers (DeWeese 2007, 139-140). From a substance-dualist perspective, one might suggest that this potential capacity resides in a person’s soul, and that this capacity could be manifested if the body is in the right condition (e.g. if the brain is adequately functional, which is not the case for foetuses, for those in a persistent vegetative state, etc).
view, natures are fundamentally concrete particulars: on this view, Christ’s human nature was fundamentally a concrete particular (this view does not deny that this particular had certain human properties). On an abstract nature view, natures are fundamentally properties: on this view, Christ’s human nature was fundamentally a property or a set of properties necessary and sufficient for being human (this view does not deny that Christ had a corporeal body, or that Jesus of Nazareth was a concrete particular) (Crisp 2007, 41-46, 68).

The concrete and the abstract nature views can be further subdivided, depending on whether Christ is conceived of as being composed of a number of “parts” (usually two or three) (Crisp 2007, 41-42). Here, it should be noted that the word “part” has many different meanings in ordinary language, and in this article it is used broadly to indicate any portion of a given entity, regardless of whether the portions are material or immaterial, connected or disconnected, can or cannot exist as separate entities, etc. So broadly conceived, a part of an entity is simply that which in some way falls short of being the whole of that entity.

On the two parts view, Christ was composed of the pre-existent divine particular and a human body, while on the three parts view, Christ was composed of the pre-existent divine particular, a human body, and a human soul distinct from the pre-existent divine particular (Crisp 2007, 41-42). Both the concrete and the abstract nature views can be classified as either consisting of two or three parts, thus yielding the following possibilities i) concrete nature, two parts Christology, ii) concrete nature, three parts Christology, iii) abstract nature, two parts Christology, or iv) abstract nature, three parts Christology (Crisp 2007, 44-45).

For reasons that will be explained below, a concrete-nature-three-parts-Christology is to be preferred. Hence, unless otherwise specified, the term “nature” is to be understood as in accordance with the concrete (not abstract) view from this point onwards.

3. The Model Stated

Having explicated the key terms, DPM will now be stated. According to this model, the Logos (the second Person of the Trinity) had a mind without a body prior to the Incarnation. At the Incarnation, the mind came to include a consciousness and a preconscious, and certain divine properties such as the knowledge of all truths resided in the preconscious (this preconscious would become part A of Jesus’s preconscious). This implies that at the Incarnation the Logos no longer had properties such as a conscious awareness of all truths. At the same time, a human preconscious (which would become part B of Jesus’s preconscious) and a human body were created. In addition, his consciousness acquired human properties that were also newly created. This acquisition included a certain extent of his consciousness’s capacity to function being made dependent on the brain, resulting in the capacity to experience physical pain, to have sensations.

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10 For further discussion, see Varzi (2009, section 1).
through physical organs, and to have the desires for food, for sleep, etc.

Therefore, at the Incarnation the Logos had a consciousness (which included access to the Divine Preconscious), a preconscious that had two parts (part A having the properties of divinity while part B having the properties of a human preconscious), and a human body.

The reason why the model proposes that the Logos had a divine preconscious from the first moment of Incarnation onwards is that this allows the Logos to remain omniscient. Since omniscience is a property of divine nature rather than human nature, the divine preconscious is postulated of the divine nature rather than of the human mind.

There has been much philosophical discussions concerning the concept of omniscience—for example, whether the extent of omniscience includes things that is supposedly knowable only by acquaintance, whether it includes knowledge of future Libertarian free actions (if such actions exist), etc— and it is beyond the scope of this paper to address these issues (See Wierenga 2010). The following qualification concerning knowledge and divine omniscience, however, is important for our purposes here. The qualification is that, for any person P to possess knowledge of y, it is not required that his knowledge of y be consciously held, i.e. it is not required that his knowledge of y be occurrent rather than dispositional. Philosopher Robert Audi explains the distinction between occurrent and dispositional beliefs as follows:

What is dispositionally as opposed to occurrently believed is analogous to what is in a computer's memory but not on its screen: the former needs only be brought to the screen by scrolling a simple retrieval process in order to be used, whereas the latter is before one's eyes. Compare a dispositionally believed proposition's needing to be 'called in', as in answering a request to be reminded of what one said last week, with an occurrently believed proposition's being focally in mind, roughly in the sense that one attends to it, as where one has just formulated it to offer as one's thesis. (Audi 1994, 420)

Thus, for example, a person might have knowledge of $2 + 2 = 4$ at time $t$, even though at $t$ he might not be consciously thinking about $2 + 2 = 4$. Note that it is not the case that this person is merely able to know $2 + 2 = 4$ at $t$; rather, he actually knows $2 + 2 = 4$ at $t$ without being consciously aware of it at $t$. This knowledge of $2 + 2 = 4$ can be said to be in his preconscious: when he chooses to direct his attention to it, that is, when he chooses to consciously think about $2 + 2 = 4$, he can be aware of it. Furthermore, a person might have dispositional knowledge of $y$, which for certain reason $R$ he is unwilling to direct his attention to. For example, $R$ could be that consciously thinking about $y$ (e.g., $y$= “my dog died yesterday”) would bring him sad memories.

Since having knowledge of $y$ does not require a constant conscious awareness of $y$, it can be argued that the knowledge of all things by a divine Person does not require his constant conscious awareness of all things. It could be the case that a divine Person (say, the Logos) chooses to let part of this knowledge reside in his preconscious. Note that the suggestion here is not that the Logos is merely able to...
know all things; as Eleonore Stump (2003, 417) points out, “omniscience is not a matter of being able to know everything... it is a matter of actually knowing everything there is to know.” Rather, the suggestion is that, just as a person actually knows $2 + 2 = 4$ at $t$ without being consciously aware of it at $t$, it could be the case that the Logos actually knows all things at $t$ without being consciously aware of all things at $t$. What this suggestion implies is that the property of eternally having a complete conscious perspective of everything all at once is not essential to divinity.

Against this, it might be objected that DPM contradicts the Scriptures, for Heb. 4:13 seems to imply that God is always consciously aware of everything. In reply, Heb. 4:13 can be interpreted as saying that all things do always lie open to a divine Person in the sense that there is no entity $x$ which has the power to resist the divine Person being consciously aware of everything about $x$ if the divine Person wants to. This does not imply that the divine Person must always be consciously aware of everything such that he cannot choose not to be consciously aware of something.

It might also be objected that DPM contradicts the view of Augustine and Aquinas, who claim that a divine Person sees all things that are in his knowledge together at once. In reply, the question that needs to be asked is whether there is any good reason to think that the property of eternally having a complete conscious perspective of everything all at once is essential to divinity. One might answer affirmatively based on a strong notion of divine immutability and divine atemporality: if a divine Person does not change at all, then he does not direct his attention from one thing to another. However, it can be argued that there is inadequate Scriptural and philosophical motivation for such a notion. (The literature on the debate concerning divine immutability and divine atemporality is huge, and it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss this debate in detail. For a survey of some of the objections, see Craig (2008). In his review of modern discussions on the Incarnation in the same handbook, Richard Cross writes, “Modern discussion in philosophical theology on the doctrine of the Incarnation still represents to some extent work in progress. But it has, I believe, shown where best to look for solutions, and what the likely shape of such solutions will be: namely...an abandonment of a strong form of classical theism ...we need to abandon divine impassibility, immutability, and timelessness.”(Cross 2008a, 470-471)

One might also object to DPM by claiming that a mind which is conscious of only a part of all reality at a time is inferior to one which is conscious of all at once, because being conscious of only a part of reality at a time would miss the “big picture” about reality and result in error, and it would also result in being able to be in control of only a part of reality at a time. In reply, if a divine Person chooses to limit the extent of his conscious awareness of all things, it does not follow that his knowledge would be incomplete or that he would possess false beliefs. This is

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11 This view has also been defended by others; see, for example, Yandell (1994); Cullison (2006): 151-160; Feinberg (2001, 317-318).
12 I thank Richard Sturch for raising this objection in private correspondence.
because the knowledge of all things would still be in his mind, just not in his consciousness, and there is no good reason why he could not ensure—by virtue of his omnipotence—that his limited consciousness contains only true beliefs and no erroneous belief. Neither does it follow that his control of all things would be limited if he chooses to limit his conscious awareness. This is because a divine Person could exercise control of all things through his preconscious without requiring his mind be consciously aware of all things. At the point of Incarnation, the Logos could have “programmed” his preconscious according to his infallible omniscience what actions the preconscious would activate in any situation throughout the universe during those moments when his consciousness was limited, such that his preconscious functioned as an infallible “autopilot”. Hence, the Logos could still take care of everything and hold the universe together (Col. 1:17) throughout every moment of his Incarnated state, in accordance with his foreordained plan.

Hence, there is no indefeasible reason to think that it is essential to divinity that the divine knowledge be contained in the conscious awareness of the divine mind, such that a divine Person cannot freely choose to let part of that knowledge reside in a preconscious part of his mind if he so desires. In the absence of such reasons, the view that a divine Person can freely choose to let part of that knowledge reside in the preconscious if he so desires would be consistent with his omnipotence.

Would Christ be able to recall his knowledge of the time of his return in his human nature? According to DPM, Christ could indeed bring this item of knowledge into awareness when he was being asked, but he chose not to do so. Now it is the case that ordinary human beings often cannot control the process whereby dispositional knowledge becomes occurrent knowledge; for example, if we were to be asked “who the first president of the United States was”, very often the proposition “George Washington was the first president of the United States” “automatically” becomes occurrent knowledge; that process is often beyond our control. In Jesus’s case, he could have exercised his omnipotence (in respect of his divine nature) to prevent dispositional knowledge from “automatically” becoming occurrent (Cullison 2006, 157-158). Such prevention would not result in Jesus’s ceasing to be truly human, for even though the general inability to control the process whereby dispositional knowledge becomes occurrent knowledge is common to human nature, there is no adequate reason to think that this inability is essential to the human nature. On the contrary, it seems theoretically possible that psychological techniques could be developed in the future such that this inability could be overcome by someone learning these techniques, but surely he/she would not thereby be regarded as not truly human then. This theoretical possibility is thus a good reason for thinking that this inability is not essential to human nature. Exercising his omnipotence (in respect of his divine nature) to prevent his dispositional knowledge from “automatically” becoming occurrent does not imply that Jesus could not access this dispositional knowledge if he chose to. On the contrary, if Jesus chose to find out about all that he believed, he would become aware of all true beliefs by accessing the whole of his divine preconscious. But he freely chose not to find out, in accordance with the divine plan to experience our limitations.

By refraining from using his divine powers, Jesus would have truly shared
much of our common experiences, such as the experiences of fatigue and the lack of conscious awareness and certainty of some future events. To use the analogy of Erickson (1998, 752), it is like the world’s fastest sprinter being entered in a three legged race, where he must run with one of his legs tied to a partner. Just as the sprinter could unloose the tie at any time but chooses to restrict himself, Jesus could have chosen to access his divine preconscious anytime but he chose to restrict himself. And just as the sprinter was not pretending when he struggled to run with his leg tied, Jesus was not pretending when he experienced our limitations. Thus Jesus was not pretending to be unaware of the day of the coming of the Son of Man in Mark 13:32. He truly was unaware. It should be noted that the Greek word oiden which is translated as “know” in Mark 13:32 and also in the parallel passage in Matt. 24:36 can mean “to have realized, perceived, to know”; it is often used in the New Testament in a general way, e.g. to know a person, to be able to understand/apprehend/recognize (Kittel et al 1964, 116-119). Therefore, in view of its semantic range, in these passages oiden can be legitimately rendered as “aware”. Thus, Mark 13:32 can be read as “But of that day or hour no one is aware, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father alone.” This reading fits the context perfectly: the disciples would be hoping that the Son would reveal to them the day, but no one can reveal what he/she is not aware. This reading would also fit with the Divine Preconscious Model’s postulation that, in his incarnate state, the Logos restrained himself from using the omniscience, i.e. he prevented himself from bringing his knowledge of all things which resided in his subconscious (including the knowledge of the day of the coming of the Son of Man) into conscious awareness, so as to share in our experiences of having limited conscious awareness.

4. Concrete natures, three-part Christology and the an-enhypostasia distinction

According to DPM, the Incarnate Logos had a complete human nature (and was truly human) in virtue of (1) the aspect of his conscious which had human properties, (2) his human preconscious (part B of Jesus’s preconscious), and (3) his human body. The Logos had a complete divine nature (and was truly divine) in virtue of the aspect of his conscious having access to the divine preconscious (part A of Jesus’s preconscious), by which he possessed all the essential divine properties. He remained a single person, in the sense of having one self-consciousness and being a single subject of divine and human attributes. Hence, the Incarnate Logos was one person with concrete human and divine natures.

The Incarnate Logos can be said to have three parts:

1. The concrete divine nature (this consists of the aspect of his consciousness having access to his divine preconscious).
2. The human body, and
3. The “human soul” (where the word “soul” is understood as the immaterial part of the person), distinct but not separate from the
On the an-enhypostasia distinction

Andrew Loke

divine nature (this “human soul” includes the aspect of the conscious which had human properties, and the human preconscious). The qualification “distinct but not separate” is important; it implies that, although the “human soul” and the divine nature were not identical, they were not disconnected from one another. Rather, the “human soul” and the divine nature were two aspects of the immaterial part of Christ. The immaterial part of Jesus, that is, the one unified soul of Jesus, had two aspects, a human aspect (= a “human soul”), and a divine aspect (= the divine nature). The human aspect had all the properties essential to a human soul, the divine aspect had all the properties essential to a divine nature, and these two aspects were distinct from one another, hence there was no tertium quid. Rather, in line with the affirmation that Jesus was truly divine and truly human, his one soul was also truly divine and truly human. Thus, the “human soul” was in actuality a distinct aspect of the soul of Jesus, and the “human soul” had no independent existence apart from the soul of Jesus.

Such a “Part Christology” agrees with John of Damascus’s statement concerning the Logos post-Incarnation that “The whole ‘he’, then, is perfect God, but not wholly God, because he is not only God but also man. Likewise, the whole ‘he’ is perfect man, but not wholly man, because he is not only man but also God” (De fide Orthodoxa, 3.1-2, 7). This runs contrary to John Webster’s interpretation of Chalcedon’s “without division, without separation”: “That is to say, to talk of divinity and humanity is not to distinguish separate aspects of Christ, as if he were part human and part divine, and as if his properties were divisible between divinity and humanity. Jesus Christ is in his entirety divine and in his entirety human” (Webster 2004). To Webster’s interpretation it can be replied that in the historical context of the council, the phrase “without division, without separation” was used to exclude Nestorianism; the difference of the terms “division” and “separation” reflected the difference in the commonality of terminology used by the Alexandrian Cyril and the Antiochenes to this effect (Sellers 1953, 214-215). There is insufficient justification, therefore, for interpreting these Chalcedonian adverbs as excluding concrete-parts Christology together with Nestorianism.

It has been mentioned above that the concrete nature view will be preferred in this article. It is true that Aristotle and almost everyone else up to the 5th century AD (including those who stated the formulae of Chalcedon) understood natures to be universals and not concrete particulars (Swinburne 1994, 211), and that the idea of human nature as a concrete particular originates in the 6th century from Leontius of Byzantium, who subsequently influenced John of Damascus, and through John the medieval theologians and the protestant scholastics (Cross 2002a; 2002b). Nevertheless, the reason for preferring concrete rather than abstract nature view is that concrete nature view allows for contradictory properties to be exemplified by Christ in two different respects: in respect of his divine nature (or qua God), and in
respects of his human nature (or qua man). Moreover, as noted previously, the concrete nature view does not deny that the particulars have properties that belong to their kinds. Rather, it is consistent with DPM’s affirmation that the human concrete particular had human properties while the divine concrete particular had divine properties. Hence, the concrete nature view according to DPM retains the idea which the framers of Chalcedon had in mind, viz. Christ had two kind essences, human and divine.

According to DPM, divine properties such as omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence were exemplified by the divine nature, not by the human nature. On the other hand, human properties such as the physicality of the body and capacity to experience physical pain belonged to the part exemplifying human nature, and not to the part exemplifying divine nature. Hence, each nature remained intact (there was no generation of a tertium quid), and there was only one person who was both a divine person and a human person at the same time.

Following Richard Cross, it can be postulated that (sans the Incarnation) each person is a sphere of consciousness of one divine substance. On this view, the substance is not a part of the person; rather, a part of the substance constitutes a person (Cross 2008a, 461). With this insight, it can be postulated that, at the Incarnation, part of the divine substance became a concrete part of Christ, and this part exemplified all the essential divine properties, thus this part would constitute a complete divine nature of Christ.

For the relationship between the persons of the Trinity, one can affirm what Crisp labels as the Weak Person-Perichoresis Thesis: the persons of the Trinity share all their properties in a common divine essence apart from those properties which serve to individuate each person of the Trinity, or express a relation between only two persons of the Trinity (Crisp 2007, 31-32). Using this, DPM can affirm that the property of being united to the human part, and the properties which resulted from this union (e.g. the property of having a material body, the property of having a limited conscious awareness), were some of the properties which belonged only to the Logos. Such properties were not shared by other divine persons, while other properties, including those which are essential to the divine nature, were shared.

The reason for preferring “three parts” rather than “two parts” Christology is that a concrete nature Christology with three parts (i.e. including a human soul distinct from the concrete divine nature, and a human body) would avoid Apollinarianism without implying either ontological Kenoticism or a tertium quid.

14 For how concrete parts Christology can accomplish this while addressing a mereological problem known as “the paradox of increase”, see Loke (2011, 493-502).

15 Cf. Crisp, who argues that, since there is only one subject in the Incarnation, Christ cannot have human personhood because he is a divine person, otherwise Nestorianism would follow. Thus, Christ is fully human but not a human person; rather, Christ is a divine person who has a human nature (Crisp 2009a, 106, 151n.28). But if we understand “divine person” as a person with divine nature and “human person” as a person with human nature, then since Christ was one person with both divine and human natures, he would be a human person and divine person at the same time without entailing Nestorianism.
but this is not the case with a two-parts concrete nature Christology.\textsuperscript{16}

Nevertheless, DPM is different from other three-parts-concrete-nature-Christologies which propose that Christ had two consciousnesses. These Christologies understand “the human soul distinct from the divine nature” as implying a human consciousness in addition to a divine consciousness. By contrast, on DPM it is not the case that an entity with a human consciousness was taken up by the Logos at the Incarnation (thus DPM is immune to the charge of Nestorianism and Adoptionism). Rather, at the Incarnation the one consciousness of the Logos acquired a human aspect in addition to the divine aspect. That is, at the Incarnation the Logos acquires the properties necessary and sufficient to exemplify a human conscious and preconscious in addition to a divine preconscious.

It should be noted that, similar to Two Consciousnesses Christology, DPM affirms that Christ had two minds: a divine mind (the aspect of his conscious having access to the divine preconscious, and the divine preconscious), and a human mind (the aspect of his conscious having human properties, and a human preconscious). Unlike Two Consciousnesses Christology, however, DPM affirms that Christ had only one consciousness, because the two minds shared one consciousness which had divine and human aspects. It should be noted that a single consciousness can have aspects which are distinct but not separate from one another: for example, my visual experience of the computer screen is distinct from my conscious access to my fingers typing the keyboard, but both are aspects of my single unified consciousness at a particular moment.

Therefore, in comparison with the somewhat unsatisfactory attempts by other three-parts-concrete-nature-Christologists to avoid the implication that a human person was assumed by the Word and maintain the anhypostasia-enhypostasia distinction, DPM avoids this implication and maintains the distinction straightforwardly. This is as follows: the human nature (i.e. the aspect of his consciousness which had human properties, his human preconscious [part B of Jesus’ preconscious], and human body) did not exist as a person independent of its assumption by the Word (anhypostasia), while from the first moment of the Incarnation the human nature existed “in” a particular person (enhypostasia). Since according to DPM Christ had only one consciousness and one self-consciousness, DPM avoids the problems with Two-Consciousnesses Christology noted in Section 1 of this paper. Hence, in these and other ways (e.g. concerning issues related to the knowledge of Jesus, the unity of the concrete parts in one person, physicalist versus non-physicalist account of the Incarnation, Dyothelitism versus Monothelitism, and the completeness of divine and human natures),\textsuperscript{17} DPM offers a significantly

\textsuperscript{16} Since a two-parts-concrete-nature-Christology denies that there is a human mind distinct from the divine concrete nature, one would have to say that the divine concrete nature was a concrete divine part as well as a concrete human mind at the same time in order to avoid Apollinarianism. But to affirm the absence of distinction between the human mind and the divine nature would seem to imply either ontological Kenoticism (if the divine properties were relinquished) or a tertium quid (if the divine properties were not relinquished). For the problems with ontological Kenoticism, see Loke (2013, section 2).

\textsuperscript{17} For a comparison of DPM with other models of the Incarnation on these issues, see Loke (2009;
improved account of the metaphysics of the Incarnation compared to other models.

**Bibliography**


