
H. E. Baber
University of San Diego

The goal of Eucharistic theology, according to James Arcadi, is to ‘posit...whatever is the best and most robust explication of the relation between the divine Word and his human nature in Christ [that] can be used to explain the relation between the human body in Christ and the consecrated elements in the Eucharist’ (266). Eucharistic theology, thus understood, recapitulates Christology. And, for Arcadi the Christology of Chalcedon sets the standards for an incarnational model of the Eucharist first, in the affirmation that Christ is both fully human and fully divine and, secondly, in the doctrine that the hypostatic union of Christ’s human and divine natures should be understood as a relation that maintains their inseparable unity, abiding distinction, and asymmetrical ordering.

The doctrine that Christ is both fully human and fully divine, minimally, sets a semantic standard for Christology requiring that the predicates ‘is man’ and ‘is God’ be literally true of Christ and, likewise, that ‘is bread and wine’ and ‘is the Body and Blood of Christ’ must be literally true of the Eucharistic elements. The Chalcedonian account of hypostatic union imposes metaphysical requirements for how the relation between Christ’s divine and human natures is to be understood and likewise for an account of union of the Body and Blood of Christ and the Eucharist elements.

Arcadi’s program therefore involves two projects which he undertakes in turn: first, a linguistic project in support of his claim that the Eucharistic elements are, in the strict literal sense, both bread and wine and the Body and Blood of Christ and secondly, after considering the metaphysics of Incarnation established at Chalcedon, the project of developing a metaphysical basis for a an incarnational model of the Eucharist that satisfies the requirements suggested by Chalcedonian Christology.

1 **Eucharistic Theology: The Linguistic Project**

Arcadi sets the stage with a taxonomy of Eucharistic theologies which have, historically, been endorsed by Christians within a range of traditions, from metaphysically robust Roman theologies to metaphysically reductivist ‘No Non-Normal’ accounts. According to theologies of the Roman variety the bread and wine of the Eucharist are transformed into the Body and Blood of Christ or obliterated and replaced by the Body and Blood of Christ and after consecration, appearances to the contrary, are gone. According to No Non-Normal accounts the elements are just bread and wine and the Body and Blood of Christ are not really present. Arcadi locates his own position within the ‘German' tradition, according to which both bread
and wine and the Body and Blood of Christ are present, as a Eucharistic theology of 'Impanation'.

Since, as Arcadi notes, both Eucharistic theology and Christology have their source in Scripture he begins with a close reading of the relevant passages in the Synoptic Gospels and Paul’s commentary on the Eucharist in 1 Corinthians, with special attention to passages describing Christ’s words and actions at the Last Supper. While he notes that the biblical data in these passages are metaphysically undetermined he argues that a careful reading and disambiguation of the Greek suggest that the Gospel writers intended that Christ’s words of institution at the Last Supper, ‘This is my Body’, should be understood as a case of ‘real predication’, an interpretation that does not fit comfortably with reductivist Eucharistic theologies.

[O]n this proposal, one cannot use the dominical words with scare quotes, this is not the “body of Christ”, Christ did not say that this is my “body” (and by “body” I mean, “not my body”)…Those on the No Non-Normal Mode edge of the spectrum probably would not refer to the bread as “the body of Christ’ simply on the level of first-order discourse (43-44).

Arcadi is careful to note however that linguistic phenomena like ‘real predication’ say nothing about any underlying metaphysical state. And initially, following his biblical exegesis, he proposes a metaphysically thin linguistic account of consecration and divine presence in the Eucharist. Adopting speech-act theory as a ‘tool’, he suggests that acts of consecration should be understood as ‘exercitive’ illocutionary acts, speech acts where ‘saying so is making so’. Such speech-acts bring about results by convention and their success depends upon the existence of social institutions in virtue of which a speaker has the authority to perform the act in question by uttering the appropriate formula under specified conditions. So, an individual by uttering the appropriate formula effects consecration, an exercitive act.

Consecration succeeds if an agent who has the authority to consecrate conferred by the linguistic community utters the required formula in appropriate circumstances with the intention of setting quantities of bread and wine apart ‘for Godly use’. This account is metaphysically innocent. Indeed, it might be argued that, understood in this way, an act of consecration could succeed even if God did not exist, since the success of the speech-act requires only that the consecrator believe that God exist in order to form the required intention—a consequence of the account that Arcadi would likely not endorse.

As to Christ’s presence in the Eucharist, Arcadi further elaborates the linguistic story. The words of institution, which figure in the act of consecration, rename the objects set apart for Godly use. Like consecration, renaming is an exercitive illocutionary act and the conditions are similar. The conceptually necessary conditions for renaming must be satisfied, the individual engaged in renaming must have the authority to do so, the appropriate conditions for the exercise of authority must obtain, and the utterance of the appropriate formula must bring about renaming where that is to be understood to introduce

---

1 ‘Impanation’ has now become standard in the literature but I wish someone would come up with an alternative. While I recognize that it’s a perfectly good formation from the Latin, parallel to ‘incarnation’, to me as an English speaker, it invariably conjures up the image of pouring pancake batter into a frying pan.
an additional name for an object, which maintains its original name as well. So Arcadi writes, when Christ or a priest acting *in persona Christi* says of the bread he holds ‘this is my Body’ he brings it about that the object in his hands can be referred to both as ‘this bread’ and ‘the body of Christ’.

Still no metaphysics and, at this point, one wonders why any metaphysics is necessary to make sense of religious faith and practice. Christians believe that ‘something happens’ when bread and wine are consecrated, and indeed it does: bread and wine are set aside for Godly use, whatever that might come to, and to that extent their status undergoes an objective change. Christians believe that Christ is really present in the Blessed Sacrament so that they may, without scare quotes, refer to it as ‘the Body of Christ’ and on this account, without the benefit of any metaphysical miracle, they can. ‘Real predication’ says nothing about any underlying metaphysics.

Arcadi however wants a metaphysically thicker account. He follows his speech-act analyses of consecration and ‘renaming’ with metaphysically thick accounts of Chalcedonian Christology and of his preferred Eucharistic theology and its near relatives in order to develop a metaphysical account of the Eucharist modeled on the theology of Chalcedon.

### 2 Eucharistic Theology: The Metaphysics

Following Sarah Coakley, Arcadi holds that the Definition of Chalcedon should be understood as ‘apophatically regulatory’, establishing a pattern for Christology within the bounds of orthodoxy while leaving ‘space for theological creativity’ (146). The pattern for Christ’s God-manhood that Arcadi extracts from Chalcedon, and which he therefore adopts as a model for his Eucharistic theology is *Three-Part Concrete-Compositionalism*. On this account, Christ is a composite consisting of three concrete components: the divine Word; Christ’s human soul/mind; and Christ’s human body. Christ is one in virtue of the *natural union* of soul and body, which holds on the soul and body of every human person, and the *hypostatic union* of the divine Word and the human nature it assumes, which is itself a body/soul composite. Arcadi will repeatedly invoke this three-part concrete-compositionalist pattern as a standard for Eucharistic theology.

The theology of Christ as a composite thus understood poses questions about the character of the hypostatic union of divine and human components. Arcadi suggests that it be understood as an instrumental union comparable to that between human souls and bodies where a person’s body is the body through which she acts. Drawing upon recent literature on the ‘extended mind’, according to which external cognitive enhancements and prostheses though which a person acts may be counted as parts of their users, Arcadi argues that the hypostatic union of the Word and Christ’s human nature should be understood as a case of ‘private instrumentality’: the Word acts in the world through Christ’s human nature and the instrumentality is ‘private’ since only the Word acts through Christ’s human nature. The hypostatic union thus understood satisfies Chalcedonian requirements. It is an inseparable union to the extent that it could only be dissolved by God himself; it maintains the distinction between Christ’s divine and human natures since the body through which the Word acts is a proper part of the composite Christ distinct from the Word; and the divine and human natures of Christ are asymmetrically ordered since the Word is the ‘enabling entity’ that acts through Christ’s human nature, and the whole, Christ who is a composite of divine Word, human soul, and body, is greater than any of its proper parts.
According to the Eucharistic theology Arcadi endorses, which he characterizes as ‘Sacramental Impanation’, the relation between Christ and the Eucharistic elements in which he is present is, likewise, an instrumental union. The Word acts through the Eucharistic elements which, thus, count as parts of Christ’s body. It is, therefore, apt to refer to the consecrated bread as ‘the Body of Christ’ in virtue of its being an extended part of Christ’s body, and the wine of the Eucharist is ‘the Blood of Christ’ since it is an extended part of his blood.

Sacramental Impanation delivers what Christians who believe that Christ is ‘really present’ in the Eucharist want. It licenses reference to the Eucharistic elements as ‘the Body and Blood of Christ’ without scare quotes. Moreover, it avoids the feature of ‘Roman’ Eucharistic theologies that most Christians do not want, viz. the doctrine that consecrated bread and wine which are, with regard to all empirically accessible properties, indistinguishable from unconsecrated bread and wine, are not bread and wine at all. Finally, it recapitulates the Chalcedonian pattern, as desired. The Eucharist, Arcadi reminds us, was instituted by Christ who, at the Last Supper, declared that the bread and wine his disciples were to consume were his body and blood. So he suggests that the main attraction of his Sacramental Impanation account of Christ’s presence is the manner in which it makes use of the metaphysical state of affairs of the Incarnation.

3 Eucharistic Theology: The Incredulous Stare

Nevertheless, the Eucharist, to the extent that it is held to involve a metaphysical miracle, is hard to swallow. And some features of Arcadi’s account stick in the craw.

First, the claim that the elements, upon consecration, become parts of Christ’s body has consequences that are, though not logically contradictory, bizarre. On this account, we shall have to say that Christ’s body enjoys a strange afterlife in which it is an amorphous spatially gappy entity consisting, at any time, of his body in heaven and detached bits of bread and wine in various terrestrial locations, and which expands and contracts as quantities of bread and wine are consecrated and consumed.

Secondly, on this account, a bit of Christ’s body is locally present where the Eucharistic elements are. Arcadi responds to the worry that a bit isn’t enough but not to the more serious concern that local presence, of even a bit, is too much. We do not want to say that what happens to the elements happens to Christ. So, Aquinas notes that Christ’s body, sacramentally but non-locally present in the Eucharist, is ‘at rest in heaven. Therefore, it is not moveably in this sacrament’. Moving around consecrated elements does not move bits of Christ around or change the configuration of his body which is locally present and at rest in heaven. That, arguably, is the rationale for Aquinas’ claim that Christ is sacramentally but not locally present in the Eucharist.

Finally, and fundamentally, Arcadi’s linguistic and metaphysical projects do not hang together. His metaphysical account of Christ’s presence on the Chalcedonian pattern does not either presuppose or build upon his account of consecration and ‘renaming’ as speech acts which, arguably, may be understood as a metaphysically minimalist alternative to the

---

2 Summa Theologiae, Tertia Pars, Question 76, Article 6.
Eucharistic theology of Sacramental Impanation he subsequently develops. While the speech-act account is interesting in its own right, it is hard to see why Arcadi, who is committed to developing a metaphysically thick theology of the Eucharist according to the pattern set by Chalcedonian Christology, should include it in developing his Eucharistic theology.

On the other hand, arguably, the metaphysically innocent speech-act account provides all the resources we need to make sense of a 'high' view of the Eucharist on the cheap. Does something 'objective' happen at consecration on this account? Certainly—not a metaphysical change but a change of status. Can we point to the bread after consecration and say truly and without scare quotes 'this is the Body of Christ'? We can, just as we can point to a position on a map and say, without scare quotes, 'that's San Diego' or perhaps even more aptly, just as a child playing a game of prop oriented make-believe can, without scare quotes, refer to a doll as her baby. Observers outside the game may use scare quotes ('they're playing house and that's the “baby”') but to participants inside the game the doll is a baby. To play the game is to adopt the linguistic and behavioral conventions that constitute it.

Participants in the Church’s liturgy are not, of course, playing a game of their own contrivance but one established by the Church on Christ’s authority. Participants do not make the rules: the conventions are embodied in the institution and actions in accordance with them bringing about institutional facts as objective as the facts that obtain by virtue of a university’s conferring an academic degree or by the government’s issue of fiat currency, which confers real, objective value on paper without the benefit of metaphysical miracles.

That said, An Incarnational Model of the Eucharist is a tour de force and a model for work in philosophical theology. Arcadi has developed and defended a detailed, original account of Christ’s Real Presence in the Eucharist, a doctrine that poses a range of philosophically interesting questions but which has received altogether too little attention by analytic philosophers. Making the case that his account is compatible with Scripture and Tradition he includes extensive Biblical exegesis and material from historical and contemporary theologians’ work on the topic, resources that are unfamiliar to those of us engaged in work in philosophical theology but are largely unacquainted with the theological literature and inaccessible to those of us who are Greekless.

In short, this is an excellent study of a topic that deserves more attention and an invaluable resource for further work on the philosophical theology of the Eucharist.