ABSTRACT

This exercise, which takes from 1 1/2 to 3 hours to run in a classroom or training setting, illustrates how power differentials impact negotiation. Demonstrates how leadership style impacts decision-making, satisfaction and negotiation style; and explores the intergroup dynamics and trust involved in negotiations. The setting is the current Middle East -- the players are the four major players in the Middle East peace negotiations: Israel, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians. Each team receives different leadership style instructions based on the predominant style that nation/group has typically used in past peace negotiations. Through several guided sets of negotiation time periods, the different teams try to achieve an optimal peace agreement.

INTRODUCTION

This negotiation exercise, focused on power differentials, is set in the context of the Middle East conflict. It involves multiparty negotiation and can evolve into coalition negotiation. This game incorporates various leadership styles thus allowing students to relate the impact of leadership style on negotiation results. This simulation grew out of our experience using coalition bargaining exercises (Dawson, 1985; Murningham, 1991) and out of theoretical work in negotiation and leadership (Lewicki and Litterer, 1985; Vroom and Yetton, 1973; Vroom and Jago, 1987). Our consulting experience in corporations, non-profit organizations and governments in four countries verifies the need to enhance negotiation skills.

Keywords: leadership; negotiation; power; team dynamics

Basic Data:

Objectives: 1) To understand how power differentials impact negotiation
2) To show that the appearance of having greater power may not predict a “better result (outcome)
3) To observe the impact of leadership style on decision-making, member satisfaction and negotiation style
4) To explore the dynamics of trust between groups with unequal resources in a competitive situation
5) To experiment with negotiating strategies and tactics
6) To explore intergroup relationships

Target Audience: Any group that would benefit from a better understanding of variables affecting negotiations, for example, students of political science, communication, psychology, sociology and business. Managers, executives, church leaders and political activists would also benefit.

Playing Time: One and a half to three hours including at least 30 minutes debriefing immediately following playing time.

Numbers of Players: 15-24. Larger groups can play the game in parallel fashion.

Materials Required: Rules of Play, Context and Team Scenarios, Leadership Style Profile, Agreement Forms, Observer Guidelines, one dollar per participant, handouts and an overhead transparency showing the countries involved.

Equipment/Room Setup Required: A table large enough for two teams (8-12 people) to sit and negotiate. Two additional rooms or spaces for non-negotiating teams to work on their strategy in private.

The Context and Team Scenarios

While the Middle East conflict has been raging for over seventy years, flaring from time to time into open aggression in which hundreds of thousands have lost their lives, Middle Eastern countries have faced war as a fact of life for centuries. Resources that could support economic solutions have been diverted to war.

While there are many parties involved in the current Middle East conflict, the four parties chosen for this simulation represent distinctive political systems and are central players in the conflict. Their different approaches to leadership will help participants see the impact of leadership style on negotiation. Each participant team will represent one party in the Middle East conflict.

Israel’s primary goal is to maintain an independent Jewish homeland within secure recognized borders that might include certain parts of the occupied territories occupied after the 6-Day War of 1967 (Gaza Strip, West Bank, Golan Heights). To achieve the primary goal, Israel must negotiate peace with its neighbors.

Syria:

Syria’s primary goals are to establish a political and military leadership position in the Middle East, including a significant influence (political and territorial) in Lebanon. They also want the return of the Golan Heights from Israel and a satisfactory resolution of the Palestinian problem.

Jordan:

Jordan’s primary goal is to eliminate dangers to its independence from aggressive bordering nations and from potential internal turmoil caused by the large percentage (50%) of Palestinians living in Jordan. To achieve this goal, they would agree to peace with Israel when and if the Palestinian problem is satisfactorily resolved in a manner acceptable to both Palestinians and other Arab nations.

Palestinians:

The Palestinians’ primary goal is to acquire an independent, recognized and secure homeland on territory currently held by Israel. At the minimum, they want the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, which is mainly populated now by Palestinians. Before Israel’s 1948 War of Independence, Palestinians owned parts of the current state of Israel.

Rules and Steps of Play

1. The facilitator formulates teams of 3-5 participants, assigns country names, selects four observers and assigns one observer to each team.
2. The participating Arab teams are required to negotiate with the Israeli team and attempt to reach a peace agreement.
3. Each participant (excluding observers) contributes $1.00 (or other amount according to the decision of the facilitator) to a pot held by the facilitator.
4. Each team selects a negotiator who receives instructions from the facilitator. An option is for the facilitator to select a negotiator he/she believes can best role-play the assigned leadership style. The facilitator provides the following Leadership Style Profiles to each of the negotiators.
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(a) To the Israeli team:

“all decisions in your team about making an agreement with any other team have to be made in a democratic style (majority rule)”

(b) To the Syrian team:

“all decisions in your team about making an agreement with any other team have to be made by the leader of the team without consulting with the members of the team” (autocratic)

(c) To the Jordanian team:

“all decisions in your team about making an agreement with any other team have to be made by the leader after consulting with each member of the team separately” (consultative)

(d) To the Palestinian team:

“all decisions in your team about making an agreement with any other team have to be made in consultation with all members of the team (consensus)

5. Observers use Observer Guidelines. The facilitator creates an Observer Guidelines form highlighting the behaviors on which he or she wishes to focus. Standard observer forms can be found in textbooks on group behavior.

6. Although each participant contributes equally to the pot, he or she may receive a different amount (or nothing) at the end of the negotiations, depending on the agreements struck.

7. There are three rounds of negotiations; two teams negotiate at the negotiating table while the other two teams sit in private locations with no communication between teams. They may, however, work on their own team strategy for the next round of negotiations.

8. Teams have 10 minutes to prepare a strategy before the negotiations begin.

9. The negotiation rounds appear in the figure below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Order of Negotiation</th>
<th>First Round</th>
<th>Second and Third Rounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel and Syria</td>
<td>5 minutes</td>
<td>3 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel and Jordan</td>
<td>5 minutes</td>
<td>3 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel and Palestinians</td>
<td>5 minutes</td>
<td>3 minutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10. At the end of the third round of negotiations, each team goes to a separate room and writes one agreement on the Agreement Form (FIGURE 2) specifying with whom they wish to make an agreement and how they would divide their payoff. They then deliver this agreement to the facilitator in the negotiation room.

11. The following are the allowable agreements and the payoff matrix:

- a) Israel and Syria receive 70% of the “pot”
- b) Israel and Jordan receive 60% of the “pot”
- c) Israel and the Palestinians receive 50% of the “pot”

Only one agreement from the above possibilities is allowed by the end of Round 3 of the negotiations.

Thus, for example, if Israel and Syria make a valid agreement, they receive a total of 70% of the money collected.

(The numbers in the payoff matrix represent the percentage of the Middle East conflict that would be resolved if the specified parties made a peace agreement).

12. The facilitator compares Agreement Forms; If any two match, these teams receive their payoff according to the payoff matrix. If none match, the “pot” is not distributed.

13. A larger coalition may be formed, but only after a two party agreement is accepted and the payoff distributed. The facilitator will allow one more round of 5 minutes of negotiation between the two parties that have already an agreement and the remaining two parties (negotiating separately with each remaining party).

The following are the rules for making broader “peace agreements:

- a) The two parties that have an agreement might choose to add a third party and divide the difference between the first and second payoff matrices among the three partners. The payoff matrix for three parties is as follows:
  - Israel + Syria + Jordan receive 90% of the “pot”
  - Israel + Syria + Palestinians receive 80% of the “pot”
  - Israel + Jordan + Palestinians receive 70% of the “pot”

- b) Finally the three partners can choose to add the fourth party and divide the difference left after the three party agreement payoff among the four partners. The payoff formula for four parties is as follows:
  - Israel + Syria + Jordan + Palestinians receive 100% of the “pot”

14. If broader “peace agreements” are made, the facilitator makes the additional payoff(s) to the agreeing teams.

15. Within each team, the distribution of payoff can be worked out in any manner agreed on by the team members.

16. If no “peace agreement” has been reached, or if there is residual money, the facilitator can allow one or more of the teams to designate a charity to which it will be donated.

Debriefing

The approach taken in debriefing depends on the concepts the facilitator chooses to highlight. According to the objectives we have presented, the debriefing questions would focus primarily on leadership styles, power differentials and the inter- and intra-group dynamics. The facilitator can ask for observers to report first, or can open up a general discussion making sure the observers’ input is included. An expanded version of debriefing details is included in “Shalom/Salaam” (Harel and Morgan, forthcoming).
REFERENCES


